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SYNOPSIS
The purpose of this study is to build up a theoretical
consturct labelled the journalistic paradigm on protest
and to test its validity against a concrete case in Hongkong.
To be more specific, it is a study of the impact y of the
newspapers. political ideology or party identification,
a major determinant of the journalistic paradigms on protest,
on their coverage of and orientation towards social protests.
The journalistic paradigm on protest, theorized on
the basis of Kuhn's conception of paradigm, Berger and
Luckmann's sociology of knowledge and Marsh.'s research
on protest, is defined as the pattern of orientation towards
protests among the journalists and media of -a nation
and is operationalized to consist of the following
(components:
1. Support of suppressive policies dealing with
the-protesters, or taking sides with the Government
in putting down social protests.
2. Concern for social order, or the tendency to upkeep
social equilibrium.
3. Politicization of a protest, or the process by
which a protest is cast in a:.-political perspective
thus defining it as political in nature.
4. Stereotyping, or the process by which a'protest
is likened to past similar and disreputable event.
5. Externalization of causes, or the process by
which the occurrence of.a protest is accounted
for by external factors rather than factors
existing within the system or institution
concerned.
6. Appeal to traditional codes of behaviour,
or radical social actions are compared with
traditional codes of behaviour to call attention
to their unorthodoxy and thus unacceptability.
The above paradigmic attributes form the dependent
variable for this study. The independent variable is
the newspapers' political ideology or its operand,
party identification, which is theorized to be a
significant, if not the most significant factor
structuring the journalistic paradigms on protest.
An examination of the locations of protest in
the ideologies relevant to Hongkong's political culture
and press structure indicates that protests have been
historically and ideologically linked more with the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rather than the
Kuomintang (KMT). It is therefore hypothesised that
alonga continuum from the right as represented by
KMT to the left as represented by CCP, the six
paradigmic attributes. will associate more with the
former. These expected relations are basically confirmed
by acontent analysis of the press's coverage of a case
in Hongkong- the Jubilee School Affair which happened
in 1978. In` short,the rightist journalistic
paradigm on protest is characterised by a protest -paranoid
or negative orientation towards protests while the
leftist is characterised by a protestism or positive
orientation. Being more diversified and less preoccupied
in outlook than the rightist and leftist, the centrist
Journalistic paradigm an protest places heavier stress
on prefessional ethics like objectivity.
In addition.-to a discussion of the major theme
mentioned above, the findings are pulled together
to shed light on issues related to the disputes on
.the nature of the press in a capitalist society,
the formation of public opinion in times .of social
conflict'and the press's role in conflict resolution
in a colonial no-party, state like Hongkong.
1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Protests have always been associated with social conflicts,
change and movements the sociological analysis of which has
produced new, exciting developments in recent years (Kriesberg,
1978). Relatively neglected for decades before World War II,
they have attracted renewed interest since then. The protests
of 1960's spurred attention to the study of particular
movements and conflicts. The attention was aided by the
revival of theorectical interest in collective behaviour
(e.g. Smelser, 1967).
However., as late as 1973, sociologists were not so happy
when they found that'the sociological literature on social
movements was sparse and disturbingly unpredictive (Wilson,
1973: p. v). This. indictment can equally be applied today to
the sad state of available research on the relationship between
protest and the media. Of the few articles that have been
published in the Public Opinion Quarterly in the last 15 years,
for example, we can easily, see the relative lack of theory
and the diffuse state. of knowledge in this area.
Meanwhile, it is becoming more and more evident that
protest behavior has permeated mass. political 'consciousness
and has become a component of most people's views of the
socio-political scene and of their ideas concerning the
conduct of the political community. Protest has become
part of many political cultures in the world. From 1969 to
21978, the number of social protests recorded to have happened
in Hong Kong increased by almost 240%. 1 However, there is
not-a single published research on the relationship between
the mass media and protests as such.
The purpose of this study is to build up a theoretical
construct labelled the journalistic paradigm on protest
and to test its validity against a concrete case in Hong
Kong. To be more specific, this is a study of the impact
of political orientation or identification, a major determinant
of the journalistic paragigm on protest, on the press's coverage
of and orientation towards social. protests. In addition, I
shall touch on areas related to the disputes on the nature
of the press, the formation of public opinion in times of
social conflicts and the press's role in-conflict resolution.
This thesis is organized into five chapters:
The first chapter gives an introduction to the objectives
and organization of the thesis.
The second chapter is an attempt to theorize the existence
and structure of the journalistic paradigm on protest.
The third chapter is a discussion of the location of
protest in the major determinant of the journalistic paradigm
on protest, i.e. political ideology, in the context of Hong Kong.
To study the press's journalistic paradigm on protest,
content analysis of the press' coverage of a case- the Jubilee
School Affair- is used. The concrete hypotheses, methodology
and findings areresented in Chapter 4.
3The last chapter is a review of the findings in
relation to the objectives of this study, Other important
implications will also be discussed.
Corroborating evidences on a few theoretical points
are drawn from a questionnaire survey conducted by this
author and are included in Appendix 4.
4CHAPTER 2
THE JOURNALISTIC PARADIGM ON PROTEST
The purpose of this chapter is to build up a theoretical
construct called the the journalistic paradigm on protest
which predicts the response patterns of the media and journal-
ists to social protests and is the dependent variable for this
study. First, I shall explicate the meaning of the concept
paradigm as used by Kuhn. Then I shall draw on sociology
of knowledge, psychology and communication to theorize the
existence and structure of the journalistic paradigm on
protest...
52.1 Paradigm as a Concept
Thomas Kuhn introduced the concept of paradigm in
1962 to explain the growth of science he kindled a series
of discussion and debates that have continued up to the
present in both the physical and social sciences (Ritzer,
1975). Kuhn has used the term in some twenty senses which
Masterman (1970) boiled down to three main types. The first
type is labelled metaphysical paradigm", a total world view,
gestalt, or Weltanschauung within a given science. Paradigm
is a way of "seeing", a general organizing principle governing
perception, a map which that describes which entities exist
and how they behave. The metaphysical paradigm performs several
functions: (1) defines what entities are the concern (and are
not) of a. particular scientific community (2) guides the
scientist where to look (and where not to look) in order to
find the entities of concern to him and (3) informs the
scientist what he can expect to discover when he finds and
examines the entities of concern to his field.
The other two types of definition are only parts of the
metaphysical paradigm. One defines "paradigm by an "exemplar"
(Kuhn 1970: p.175), another by specific tools" and "instruments
(Ritzer, 1970: p. 6). These two definitions are too narrow,
it is 'the broad metaphysical paradigm that 'is of interest to
many social scientists who have borrowed the term to refer
to a coherent set of, assumptions, frameworks, attitudes and
theories in the study of social phenomenon (Ritza,'1975).
A theme from the sociology of knowledge is relevant
for our discussion at this point. According to Berger and
6Luckmann (1977: p. 30), society has a dual nature of
objective facticity and subjective meaning which are
dialectically related. In other words, society is
socially constructed and the pictures in our head
(ie. paradigm) are imputed from the very reality.
Personal biography, social issue and human history, in
Wright Mills' words (1973: P•9-32), all come into play in
'ithe structuring and processing of human consciousness.
These influencing factors may be fairly explicit, such
as the generally accepted code of sc] ei-ice and ethics of
journalism, or it may be quite unintentional, that people
just take it for granted without much conscious thinking.
Paradigm, in this sense, is a conscious or unconscious,
direct or indirect construct of constellation of consciousness
(Berger and Luckmann, 1971: p. 19) which is originated from
the social reality and to some extent mirrors the social
reality and guide social behavior at the same time.
72.2 An application in Journalism
By the same token, this kind of interaction between
social reality and individual consciousness also applies
in the field of journalism, leading to what I shall call
the joournalistic paradigm. As mentioned above, a
metaphysical paradigm refers to a very abstract and high
level state of mind. Along the same line of thought but
on a lower level, Altheide (1976) has developed his
conception of the news perspective, by which he means the
more concrete personal and organizational factors which may
affect news reporting. Journalistic paradigm as a theore-
tical construct is the concretization of Kuhn's metaphysical
paradigm and the expansion of Altheide'.s concept. Journal-
istic paragigm, then, on the one hand refers to the sets of
assumptions, attitudes and theories which affect the
conception of journalism, and on the other hand the complex
of economic., personal and organizational- factors that
determines the practice of news reproting. More specifically,
it stands for the journalists' sets of concepts about the
professional ethics, the definition of news, the philosophy
)f mass media,'other social objects and daily practices.
one such social object that is of particular interest to
This study is protest.
Protests have happened in Britain so often that
Marsh (1977: pp, 14-15) maintains that having some
attitude towards protest has become part of our political culture
and this is true -even if much of that body of opinion
is negatively inclined. Supported by his study, Marsh
concludes that far from being a random area of unrelated
responses, people's beliefs and attitudes about protest
8form a coherent area of thought that 1.s at once both complex
and simple and which coalesces psychologically in a way that
was previously unsuspected. The attitudes of journalists
towards protests must be more structured because they are
generarly more educated and more exposed to protests which
are subjects for their coverage. Therefore we can theorize
that the journalists' orientation toward protests constitute
part of the journalistic paradigm. It is this journalistic
paradigm on protest that is of particular interest to us.
In an effort to measure a person's propensity to engage
in protest, Alan Marsh protest(1977) coined the concept "prtest
potential". He argues that the protest potential of the
British people is a function of the location of protest in
the contextual political culture, their party identification,
class identification, experience, age, efficacy, trust with
the government and their individual state of satisfaction.
It is expected that all the listed factors apply to Hong
Kong population in general and the journalists in particular
perhaps with varying degrees of effect. Alan Marsh has
found that the protest potential is significantly more
associated with the Labour and Liberal than with the
Conservative Party. This means that political ideology
or party .identification is a significant factor in determining
people's attitudes towards social protest.2 In light of the
heavy traditional involvetent in politics, political orientation
or party identification probably ranks the most significant
determinant. It is the relation between political ideology
and the journalistic paradigm on protest that forms the focus
of this study.
9The major features of the Journalistic paradigm on protest
constitute the dependent variable for this stud,y'. The
journalistic paradigm on protest is defined as the patterns
of orientation towards social protests among the journalists or
{nedia of a nation and is. operationalized to consist of the
following components:
1. Support of official policies dealing with the protesters,
or taking sides with the Government in suppressing social
protests.
2. Concern for social order, or the tendency to upkeep
social equilibrium.
3. Politicization of the event, or the process by which
a protest is cast in a political perspective thus
defining it as political in nature.
4. Stereotyping, or the process by which the protest is
likened to past similar and disreputable event.
5.. Externalization of causes, or the process by which
the occurrence of a protest is accounted for by
external factors rather than factors existing within
the system or institution concerned.
6. Appeal to traditional codes of behaviour, or
radical social behaviours are compared with trad-
itional.codes of behaviour to call attention to
their unorthodoxy and thus unacceptability.
In the next chapter we shall see how each of the
said paradigmic.attrinutes are derived from and associate
with the political ideologies in the context of HonRkon
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Like Kuhn' s metaphysical paradigm which is a way of
seeing and a general "organizing principle of perception",
the journalists' paradigm on protests provides the perspectives
and guidelines against which journalists reads a protest.
That human perception is affected by values, attitudes and
goals have been well documented by psychologists (Combs et
al., 1976: P-138). A common method for doing this kind of
study is the projective test in which a subject is asked to
tell a story about a picture, for examrle, the details of
which, are purposely quite vague and ambiguous. Therefore,
whatever story the subject tells is a projection from his
own personality or experience, which provides the skilled
interpreter with a sample of some of the-'subject's meanings.
In perceptual terms, such tests make it possible to explore
a person's perceptual field with particular reference to the
goals, values, attitudes and techniques in his unique
organization. In .Fersterheim's words (1953): The less
well defined is the stimulus,... the greater will be the
contribution of the perceiver. Media perception as well
as 'journalists' perception are expected to be subject to
the same psychological laws. Stuart Hall (1970, 1973) has
Pointed out that the role of the media in the labelling
process is at maximum in situations which are unfamiliar
or ambiguous.
So, in case of a radical protest, the press and
journalists will likely respond in accordance with their
11
paradigmatic views of protests. We can theorize that in
cases where the protest is ambiguous in nature- radical
in form, but controversial in content- the journalistic
paradigm on protests will come into play and the under-
lying features of the paradigm will be exposed throu vh
the press's and the journalists' treatment of the event on
paper. It is the intentioncfthis author to select such a




POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND THE JOURNALISTIC PARADIGMS ON PROTEST
The purpose of this chapter is to delineate the relation
between political ideologies and the journalistic paradigms on
protest.. In the first section, I shall locate political ideo-
logies, or their social institutions, political parties, and
protests in Hong Kong's political culture. This is a general
.background analysis. Next I shall focus on the location of
protest.in the political ideologies relevant to the press and
journalists in Hong Kong. In the third section, I shall
relate political ideologies to the press structure. Finally,
a summary of the argument will be given.
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3.1 Ideology in HK's Political Culture
Almond and Powell (1966) define the political culture of a
nation as the particular distributions of patterns of orientation
towards-political objects (e.g. parties, election system, consti-
tution,protests, pressure groups, etc.) among the members of a
nation. In this section I shall describe the general social
attitudes towards political ideologies or political parties,
pressure groups and protests.
Hong Kong is a totality in itself-- it is a colonial
city-state (King, 1973: P.35). There are seven registered local
associations in Hong Kong, all apolitical in nature.3 Four of
them are registered as political parties while the other three
are registered as "clubs" and associations. Of the seven, only
two-- the Reform Club and the Civic Association-- have been
the only organized bodies that put up candidates in the Urban
Council elections. Even these two parties do not have a firm
Political platform to start with. They have satisfied them-
selves with the social and economic realities of Hong Kong.
Moreover, the powers and functions of the Urban Council are
so limited that the electorate itself is not althogether interested
in its elections (Wong,.1970: pp. 7-8). So no political scientists
have ever seriously considered Hong Kong having a formal party
system of its own. Peter Harris (1978: p.11) simply calls it
"an. administrative no-party state."
In contrast, recent China's party system dominated by the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Chinese Kwomintang Party
(KNIT) seem to have been more socially and Politically signi-
ticant in Hong Kong. Being unregistered with the Government
14
both. parties either work underground or openly behind the
veils of some socially more acceptable institutions. The
inter-party disputes spilled over from the Civil War periods
had culminated in a political riot in 1956 which was a
faction-fight between KMT and CCP supporters. (Miners, 1979: p.32)
In between Taiwan and China, the Hong Kong Government
tries to maintain some kind of balance and to play one against
the other, giving itself room for maneuvers. According to
Peter Harris, the British authorities in Hong Kong is operating
a pluralistic society but with certain limits. All groups
including the KMT supporters could pose a particular threat
to Hong Kong's stability if left wholely unchecked, in view
of the sensitiveness of China on the matter. All groups,
rightists or leftists, are permitted to operate until they
break the law. They are free to organize trade unions,
publish newspapers and distribute propaganda. A subtle
balance of power exists to give effect 'to this pluralism
which, in many ways, is the essence of Hong Kong's political
stability. (Harris, 1978: p.8) However, one of the constant
rears haunting the :Government is the possible expansion of
Jommunist influence among the people. That is why-it always
Ceeps a keen eye on the radical or leftist activities (SCOPG, 1978)
There has been no study of the general population's attitude
towards these two parties. Not many people seem to strongly
identify with either party because flags flown voluntarily by
individuals on two respective national days are few in number.
This is also reflected by the general low circulation of Party-
linked papers. On the whole, the majority are believed to be
centrists to the right. Hoadly (1970) asked the general public
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a ,question on the future of Hong Kong, 29% wished to remain
linked with Great Britain, 7% wished to be part of China,
12% wished to become independent and 52% had no opinion. That
only 7% of the respondents wished Hong Kong to be reunited with
China is understandable in light of the fact that almost half
of the Hong Kong Chinese are refugees from mainland China.
Only in 1951 the population increased from 600,000 to 2,360,000
as a result of the influx of refugees from Kwangtung province
and many other parts of China (Miners, 1979: p.34). Many of
these refugees were KMT members, affiliates, capitalists,
landlords,-intellectuals and people from other walks of life.
Naturally they were anticommunist in outlook. On local public
affairs, they were generally described as apathetic (Lau, 1978
Miners, 1979). A Chinese Legislator put it in more vivid war:
Hong Kong is the lifeboat China is the sea. Those who have
climbed into the lifeboat naturally don't want to rock it
(Hoadley, 1970: p.211). The refugee mentality prohibits the
flourish of political activities, which are generally regarded
as the creation of unnecessary conflicts and dissent. In fact
most citizens involved in local politics prefer to call it by
another name, for example, puble service, reserving the term
politics to describe the polemics between KMT and CCP (Hoadley,
1970: p.211).
There was'not much change in the political climate until
the late sixties when spontaneous and political riots broke
out (Wong, 1970). The 1966 riot in protest against an increase
in ferry fare led to the decentralization and sensitization of
the Government ()King, 1973). Inspired by the Cultural Revolution,
the Communist-led riots in 1967 clashed head-on with the anti-
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communist mentality of the population majority. The stability
of the Colony was once at stake but was skilfully maintained
with effective Government measures, aided by general support-
from citizen associations and the restraint exerted by Peking
(Miners, 1979: p. 243).
The entry of China into the United Nations and its almost
universal recognition in early seventies once again launched
China onto the limelight of the international political arena,
making it more acceptable both to the media and the people
.a t large. This sociable image is further enhanced after
the downfall of the Gang of Four, when Teng's pragmatic
policies succeed in fostering an unprecedented friendly Sino-
British relationship as signified by the Hong Kong Governor's
attendance at the National Day celebration of the People's
Republic of China in recent years and the numerous visits to
China by high Government officials. With the huge potential
Chinese market in mind, many capitalists are putting politics
aside and flock for the first chance to shake hands with the
Jommunists who are now maintaining an open-door policy. The
nedia have been giving wide publicity about these activities
vhich are believed to have some desensitizing effect on the
)eople's phobia of Communism.
This shift in international politics is accompanied by
changes in. Hong Kong's demographics and social structure which
result in change in the social political orientation (Lau, 1978:
.:P.38 Miners, 1979: pp. 31-42). The .first generation of locally
born and educated Chinese, below 30, comprises 59.4%/ of the
Population.4 Being baptized by rapid urbanization and western
education, they have developed traits which are sometimes
17
remarkably different from their parents'. Politically, they
are less apathetic and are more concerned about local public
affairs. It is found that 62% of the population pay close
attention to public affaris (Lau, 1978: p. 20). They are
expected to be less paranoidic about the Communists as they
have not witnessed the social turmoils which their parents had
experienced. Now few ideological converts of the N ionalist
Party can be found among today's young people othe than a
handful who study in the surving KMT-linked scho,As. On the
whole, the KMT influence is receding (Harris, 1978:p.7).
Instead, the long line of student movements taking place
since the'late sixties have radicalized a portion of the
student body and the whole campus atmosphere. However, to be
a leftist remains socially undesirable and the majority of the
people shares an antipathy towards communist rule.
Moreover, the younger generation is found to be much less
utilitarianistically familistic than the older gereation. -Using
utilitarian f amilism to explain the extraordianry political
stability of Hong Kong (Lau, 1978: p.9) refers to the normative
and behavioural tendency of an individual to place his familial
interests above the interests of society as well as its consti-
tuent individuals and groups, and to structure his relationships
with other individuals and groups in such fashion that the
furtherance of his familial interests is the primary considera-
tion. Moreover, among the familial interests, materialistic
interests takes priority over all the non-materialistic interests
He argues that this utilitarian f amilism is typical of a majority
of the Chinese people in Hong Kong. The graudal erosion of
parental authority and the diminution of social control
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exercised by the families, together with the continuing
modernization of Hong Kong, this younger generation will be
characterized less by political apathy than by a growing
sense of belonging and social justice. People are becoming
more aware of their interest and rights and more prone to
making their voice heard. Repeated dismissal of their
grievance may lead to protest. The success of some of
these protests in drawing the Government's and the public's
attention and relatively quick answers from the decision
makers seems to have popularized this form of pressuring.
The underprivileged are underrepresented in the Legislative
and Executive Councils which are manned by appointed representa-
tives from the rich and the powerful (Rear in Hopkins, p.76).
As Hong Kong is rapidly developing, conflicts of interest among
socail strata or between the Government and the. people are
bound to surface. As indicators of these conflicts, a host
of new pressure groups, so labelled by the Government, have
cropped up in the last decade( SCOPG, 1978). However, this
new breed of-pressure groups should be distinguished from the
well-established and powerful pressure groups which have easy
access to the Government elites. Open protest is never the
name'of the game. In Miner's words (1978: p.210): "The best
arguments clearly and persuasively stated at a private meeting
will often- achieve all that a group wants, and well-established
organizations hardly ever need to go further than this. Such
points may be made formally at an advisory board meeting, or
privately on the phoneor'during a social gathering". Neither
are new pressure groups similar to the traditional kaifong
(neighbours) association that prevailed some fifteen years
19
ago. Their relation with the Government have been mainly
harmonious and ceremonial. Of interest to my study are the
new pressure groups which include trade unions, professional
or religious groups which are interested in promoting not
only the welfare of their own members but also what is pledged
to be communal good.
To name but a few of the more salient groups: The
Professional Teachers' Union (1973), the Society of
Community Organization (1971), the Education Action Group
(1971), the Hong Kong Christian Industrial Committee (1963),
the Hong Kong Obervers (1974) and the Hong Kong Federation
of Students (1958). Many of these groups seldom hesitate to
resort to protests within the law when other channels to the
Government are blocked or proved ineffective. It is their
unorthodox outspokenness and sometimes militant action that
have created contradictory images for themselves. Their
apparently high efficacy contrasts with the people's diffuse
feeling of-political powerlessness. It is found that 91.2%
of the population disclaimed the possession of any power to
change the society of Hong Kong (Lau, 1978: p.21). He argues
that not only the general efficacy is low but most people seem
not to be aware of forms of interest articulation or interest
aggregation, not to say representation at the. Government level.
Relatively new social entities like radical pressure groups
may therefore mean different t:hi nc s' to different: neopl e.
To=the liberal and rad.ical., they probably stand for
group interest or social justice. To the conservative, they
may be just a bunch of activists, if not Communists. To the
centrist majority, opinions may split.
20
The Government's attitudes towards these pressure groups
is one of love-and-hate relationship. On the one hand, it
argues that in a place where established political parties and
a universal electoral system do not exist pressure groups
provide the local community with a useful and sometimes timely
safety valve (SCOPG, Annex B). On the other hand, it is
guarding the possible infiltration of the Communists into these
groups, social instability and accumulative damaging effect
on the Government's reputation which may be brought about by
the groups' activities.
Protesting was rare, if not a taboo, in the politically
apthetic Hong Kong about 15 years ago but was made familiar
by the world-wide student movements in the sixties and later
by the student unrests at home. Based on a data base compiled
by Lang (1981), about 560 social protests and conflicts, staged
by the pressure groups, were'recorded by the press to have
happened from 1969 to 1978. In between the years the occurence
frequency has an al m o s t 240% rate of increase. The forms of
protests include petition, sit-in, sleep-in, hunger strike,
demonstration, mass rally and direct confrontation :Some journalists
remark that protests are occurinp so often that tbnv have lost some
of .heir attention. In an effort to regain big coverage by the media,
the protesters have been creatively putting on new forms of
Protests.5 For instance: failing in various essays, the junk
people who wanted to move into Government housing sent a
coffin, wreaths and the picture of a drowned girl in 1979 to
remind the.Housing Department of their urgent need. In 1980
some 500 top-floor residents of a Government housing project,
suffering from high temperatures caused by faulty roofs, staged
21
a fan-in in front of the Housing Authorities. Generally
speaking, protests have become acceptable as legitimate
means of expression when one's interest is threatened.
Given such a protest culture of Hong Kong, it should be
pointed out that the chief concern of the population is to
maintain social stability. It is found that 87% of the
population prefer social stability to economic prosperity
41% of the respondents indicated willingness to remain in
a.society with social stability but without too much social
justice (Lau, 1978: p. 13). In Hong Kong, many people are
disposed to preserve social stability at any costs and this
disposition implies that the same people would refrain from
or have negative views about protesting activities which are
perceived to lead to the disruption of social stability. So
a large-scale radical protest is bound to be socially con-
troversial.
22
3.2 The Ideological Location of Protest
The previous section has established the location of
parties, (political ideologies) protests and pressure groups
in Hong Kong's political culture. I shall now shift my
point of observation into the domain of political ideology
itself to examine how protest and its pertinent objects, such
as student movements, pressure groups and government lie in
relation to the ideological and partisan reference points of
the Hong Kong Chinese journalists.
Ideology covers a broad field. To different schools or
branches of social science, "ideology" carries different
meanings and connotations. Marx and Engels (1975) sometimes
used the term "false consciousness" in relation to ideology
modern anthropologists and sociologists often use the term
"belief-systems" (Eysench, 1978: P-304) Mannheim (1955)
reserves the name "ideology" for right wing idea systems,
suggesting the term "utopia" for left-wing ones. All these
terms have special connotations but, for the purpose of this
discussion, they need not concern us too much. I am adopting
a broader, in a sense more psychologistic, definition of
ideology as advanced by Plamenatz (1970: p.15). He defines
ideology as "a set of closely related beliefs or ideas, or
even attitudes, characteristic of a group of community."
The American political psychologist Philip Converse
(1964) suggests that only about 10% of the population have
complex belief-system that deserve the name-of ideology and
it is only among these well-educated that themes of ideology
and motivation would hang together. So, ideological analysis
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is only applicable to this section of the population.
Journalists, who are usually well-educated and knowledgeable
with politics, should be appropriate objects for ideological
analysis which I am going to do in this section.
.All that is written and known about political ideology
suggests, that it is highly correlated with party identifica-
tions. Because party identification can easily be measured,
it is often used as an operational variable for mapping
peopl'e's political ideology (Marsh, 1977). This means that
the congruence between a party member's political ideology-
increases with the strength of his party identification.
Marsh (1977: p.82) has found that there is a significant
relationship between the party identification and protest
potential of the British people. By protest potential, he
means the propensity to engage in protest activities. His
survey confirms the hypothesis that protest potential is
associated much more with-Labour and Liberal sympathies than
with Conservative support. It is further found that the
party supporters are divided by arepression potential scale
which is to measure people's propensity to use suppressive
measures to end a protest. The general correlations between
party identification and protest potential/repression potential
are also found to hold when the respondent's political orienta-
tions are translated into a left-right continuum. In the last
section, I have argued that the two Chinese parties, CCP and
KMT, are the only parties socially and politically relevant to
the Hong Kong Chinese. The cleavages between the two parties,
,-aused by difference in ideology and past bitter rivalling
3xperiences, appear to be'wider than those among the British
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parties. It is expected correlations between party
identification along the CCP-KMT'continuum and protest
potential and repression potential not only hold with
Hong Kong's press and journalists but would be more
significant. We can also deduce that the same relations
will hold when protest potential or repression potential
are plotted against a left-right continuum appropriate to
Hong Kong. Henceforth, I shall refer to KMT as the right
pole and CCP as the left pole on a continuum. In cases
where people do not show preference in their party
identification at all, I suppose, on a priority grounds
and based on experience, that their political ideologies
will be more accurately described by "centrism", a mani-
festation of which among the journalists can be professional
ethics.
Now I have theoretically establish the congruence between
party identification and political ideology and the significant
correlations between, protest potential and party identification.
So, by locating protest in an ideology, we shall be able to
make educated guesses on the journalistic paradigm on
protest :held by the journalists or newspapers identified
with such an ideol.oRy. I shall start with KNT on the
right, followed. by CCP on the left and ended with centrism
of the commercial press and its journalists.
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3.3.1 Protest In KMT Ideology
T' ung Meng Hui, the prototype of Kuomintang, was a
revolutionary body aiming at the dethronement of the Ching
Emperor and the establishment of a republic. Prior to its
success in 1911, its members were devoted patriots who were
motivated by the desire to free China from backwardness and
dominance by imperial powers (Yang, 1959). Violence, not
to say other forms of peaceful protest, was taken for granted
as a means to the ends. The agitative activities of the
party's. members among the students and the ordinary people,
unorthodox to the then political culture, were hailed as the
most respectable deeds.
After unsettling the Emperor, T'ung Meng Hui was
reorganized and expanded to absorb new members in 1922,
then known as the Chinese Kuomintang. Many people, motivated
by selfish reasons, jumped on the bandwagon of revolutionary
success and enrg lied in the, new party (Yang, 1959). However,
Sun Yat-sen, founder of KMT, and many leading elites were
revolutionary in outlook. Dr. Sun's political thoughts,
known as the Three People's Principles, were accepted as
the party's official ideology which signified a radical break
from the feudalistic past. Even at his deathbed, Sun wrote
these words in the last testament: The. revolution is not
done yet, Comrades have to struggle on.. (Elegant, 1912:-p.1).
Despite his devotion to the abolition of the petrified past,
it should be mentioned that Confucius' thoughts had found its
way into Dr.'Sun's work. He did devote a number of pages in
his major work, The Three People's Principles, to emphasise the
importance of-traditional values and morals like loyalty and
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f amilism.. The traditioanl concept of self-cultivation was
given an important place in his message (Sun, 1955). In another
place, Dr. Sun (Sun, 1955: p• 105) argues that the state
should have priority over individuals in exercising their
freedom. He goes on to infer that if students and soldiers
demand freedom......, there would be no rules in schools
and barracks by then how can you call them students and
troops?
KMT did not come to the firm grip of power until 1927
when the contesting warlords were suppressed and the majority
in the Communist Party massacred. Being a ruling party, KMT
began unlearning its former attitudes towards protest and
opposition political activities and took on suppressive
measures to intimidate the activists. Maintenance of the sta-
tus quo became the primary concern of the party and the
government.
Confucianism, which emphasizes the harmony of relative
social and familial positioning-- with the son respecting
the father, the young respecting the old, the ruled respecting
the ruling, the low respecting the high-- began to loom large
as part of the KMT's declared philosophy. Chiang Kai-shek,
heir to Dr Sun, throughout his life claimed that Confucius's
and M'encius's works provided him with the highest guiding
principles (Tong, 1979 Chiang, 1966: p4178). In his last
testament, later approved to be KMT's guiding principles, he
asserts that the restoration of traditional culture in main-
land China is one of the three major tasks of the party.
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Student or social protest in which the young rise against
the old, the low against the high, is not something that can
easily reconcile with Confucian philosophy as such. Repeated
defeats by the Communists had led Chiang and some party historian
to cast negative views on even the greatest Chinese student
movement--the May Fourth Movement--on the ground of its havinv
made wary for Communism (Yang, 1959: p. 153). This paranoid
about protest had its lingering effect on KMT's policies in
Taiwan. Spontaneous and protests of all sorts are discouraged
and strictly controlled. KMT could. not even spare liberalism,
not to say Communism (Hung, 1976: p.3). In the early seventies
when the movement to protect an oil-rich archipelago (Tiao Yu-
tai Islands) from Japanese occupation fared among the overseas
Chinese students, the restless local Taiwan students.were kept
relatively silent.6 The journalistc paradigm on protest of
Chung-yang Daily, KMT's organ, once again evidenced itself.
At the inception of the event, the daily reported on the
demonstrations in the United States, suggesting that the
Chinese students abroad supported the government's position
yet beneath the surface there was a sense of nervousness.
(Hang, 1976: p.8). An editorial on February 5, 1971 asserted
that Japan was not faced with the problem of militarism, and
any attack on the revival of Japanese militarism would be
seen as part of a Chinese Communist plot to divide the anti-
Communist camp. Though this editorial did not refer to the
ongoing student movement, Chinese students in the United States
were enraged by the implicit accusation that the movement was
instigated or c.ontrolled by the Chinese Communists (Huang,
1976: p.8).
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We have seen how KMT's bitter experience with student
movements left a permanent mark on its paradigm governing
the perception of radical social actions, in addition to
the influence from Confucianism. The rightist press and
journalists are ideologically, and sometimes organizationally,
linked with the KMT in Taiwan. Being survivers of the
Communist rule, some of the senior editors continue to adopt
the prevalent paradigm on protest. Many of the younger
journalists receive their education either in Taiwan or
Nationalist colleges in Hong Kong, so they should be more
inclined towards the KMT orthodox ideology. That the Communists
can make more troubles than KMT in Hong Kong enhances the
latter's negative orientation towards protests alien to its
party interest. In cases where the protest would embarass
the Communists the KMT-linked press will publicize and support
Lt. But this kind of protest is rare. The pointis: KMT is
constantly suspicious of Communist motive and plot, and vice
Tersa. KMT's negative journalistic paradigm on protests was
reinforced by their experience with the social turmoil aroused
)y the Communists in 1967, which had almost ended the life of
long.Kong as a free port.? It is expected that these negative
Ittitudes will be carried over to student and mass protests
even if they are not political (involving party politics)
In nature. It is also expected that these attitudes will
be carried over to the social objects pertinent to protests
such as pressure groups which are not only voiceferous but also
radical in making their points known to the Government. Naturally,
cut of ideological orientation and self interest, the rightist
press.would find themselves closer to the Government which
represents.the status quo of Hong Kong.' It is true that
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all political factions in Hong Kong would agree that social
reform should be conducted in the framework of social
stability, but the questions is that political ideology
makes them assign different weights to the importance of
reform. In other words, political ideology determines
their perception of 'the extent to which reform may upset
stability. It is expected that KMT ideology is associated more
with social order and stability than social change or reforms.
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3.3.2 Protest in the Communist Ideology
While it is punishment for KMT, protest is reinforcement
for CCP. Student movements and mass protests are normative
strategies adopted by the Communists in their long struggle
for power. Many of China's now ruling secretariats were once
leaders of student movements (Ho, 1954). To them, protest
is a form of class struggle which constitutes the core of
their ideology. Mao (1969) maintains that whenever there
is suppression, there will be rebellion. Unorthodoxy is not
a question. He asserts that destruction always precedes con-
struction. Social order is not intrinsically good. Instead,
contradictions are universal. It is through the resolution
of these contradictions, he argues, that history advances.
He classifies social contradictionsinto two types-- the people's
internal contradictions and antagonistic contradictions between the
people and their enemy. When KMT was ruling China, the social
contradictions were taken to be irreconciliable and antagonistic.
They could only be solved by armed struggle. Here comes Mao's
most famous dictum: Power grows out of the barrel of a gun.
Comparing with armed struggle, protest is a very mild form of
struggle. Mao, himself a veteran leader of student movement,
wrote several treatises on youth movement during his stay in
Yunan. Movement and protest as such were then given an official
position in the orthodox ideology when these writings were
included in Mao's Selected Works, which have taken the place
of Confucius' books.
Since many of the student movements were organized by
the underground communists, the press under the Communist
control or sympathetic towards the leftists play up the news
about the students' activities. In contrast, the KMT papers
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and the papers inclined towards the right tried to dwarf the
news impact by all means (Lee-hsia, 1974 Huang, 1976).
Like all ruling parties, the Communist Party is,begining
to discourage and to suppress radical movements that are
directed at itself. They believe, on the one hand that their
system is flexible and responsive enought to accommodate the
needed reforms. On the other hand, they believe in the
dictatorship of the proletariat or the Party. Their growing
reserved attitudes towards social protests is evidenced by
their suppression of the democratic movements in 1957 and in
recent years. 8 Of course, the Cultural Revolution is an
exception to the rule.
Despite that the Communists have tried to dampen the
young people's enthusiasm for protest movements, the Party's
ideology dictates that their. glorious past has to be exclaimed
to be contributing towards their cause. The anniversaries of
the important movements were honoured in ceremony and in words.
Recently a booklet reaccounting the "December-12-Movement" (Ching
Hua University, 1980) emphasises the leading role of the Party.
Who is leading a movement? This is always a question that
determines much of the Party's response. If the leadership is
in the.. hands of alien forces, it will be attacked. The reverse
is true. Spontaniety is a good word in the Communist dictionary.
Prior to 1949, spontaneous struggles were earnestly supported
by the Communists who could skilfully directed the mass to their
cause. Should this happen now in China, it will be suspected
and defused. It is being likened to bourgeoise liberalism or
even anarchy by the regime.
32
Hong Kong, a Chinese territory, is under British rule.
The idea of having a colony within Chinese waters is incompatible
with the Communist ideology. However, China needs Hong Kong
for political, economic and strategic reasons (Harris, 1978:p.8-IC
So the relationship between the local Communists and the British
Government is twofold in nature: union in struggle. It is
expected that the Communists would not go so far as to risk
the stability of the Government in advocating support for the
have-nots. However, the good Sino-British relationship should
not prevent them from exerting pressure or calling criticism
on the Government if they deem it necessary. It is obvious
that the local leftist press and journalists organizationally
and/or ideologically linked with the Party are more supportive
of social protests than their counterparts in China. The out-
spoken pressure groups, sometimes projected or regarded as the
articulators of the interests of the underprivileged should
also be in their confidence and favour.
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3.3.3 Protest in "Centrism
The press that does not polarize itself by party identi-
fication belongs to the centrist category which is characterised
by its primary concern for commercial success. The centrist
press and journalists are by no means apolitical. They are
well versed in and sensitive to party politics but they do not
commit themselves organizationally or even ideologically. Their
loyalty lies with Hong Kong, and China only secondarily. If
they do have a political ideology, it would be pluralism of
some sort. They believe in the market economy. However, they
would not like to see the society develop without any Government
or public regulation. Reformism is the mainstream political
ideology. In Gusfield's words (1970: p. 86-87): "What charact-
erises reform is its gradualist and legitimate status. Operation
within the institutional structure for conflict regulation, the
rules of the game', is a major form of reformist action. What
is sought are usually changes in specific institutions rather
than general shifts in major social values or in the forms of
authority. In these respects reform contrasts both with the
episodic and sometimes illegal nature of protest and with the
general-and also immediate demand of revolutionary action."
This general description also applies to the KMT and CCR press
as well. However, it should be pointed out that the leftists,
centrists and rightists each leaves different rooms for "radical
reforms and attach different weights to social reforms. The
leftists are more radical reformists while the rightists are
much milder ones
Some political press can survive with a limited readership.
Since they are financed by either CCP or KMT. But the commercial
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press has to rely on its advertising revenue and has to vie for
the largest possible audience. It is thus expected that it.
will be more responsive to the opinions of its target readers,
if not the population at large. While the political press hes
a propaganda mission to perform, the centrist press cares
much more about local issues which affect the daily welfare
of the citizens.
Associated with the commercial consideration of the
centrist press is the non-political ideology of journalistic
professional ethics, however crude they may be by western
standards. Despite the constant intellectual. criticism of low
quality of the local press, objectivity, i mnnrti_ali.ty, and i ndepend-
ence are the ideals that guide their treatment of news. It is
expected that the centrist press and journalists are less
predisposed towards protest than-their party-linked counter-
parts. Investigation always preceded judgment. As far as pro-
tests are legal, they will probably be reported.
To some extent, pressure groups are representative of
a segment of the population which may ranee from a few to
thousands of people. Anyway, the centrist press can hardly
lose some of their readers by neglecting or portraying
negatively the pressure groups. It is always possible that
the press may agree with the pressure groups in their stands
since both claim to be speaking on behalf of the people. But
this harmony between the press and the pressure groups should
not be overstated as the militancy or radicality of the pressure
groups,is potentially a source of cleavages.
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3.3 Ideology and HK's Press Structure
According to Seymour-Ure(1974), the parallelism between
the range of parties in a social system and the range of papers
is generally high in European and third world countries.
Organization links between newspapers and parties exist
slightly more often than not. Parallelism with press is
stronger in multi-party systems than in two-party systems,
but less strong than in one-party systems where the press is
typically linked very closely to the party both in organization
and in goal. In no-party systems the press typically is left
in private ownership but is "supervised" by-the Government.
In general, no party regimes have left the press alone while
it supported them but have jerked the reins if.its hostility
proved irritating. In the absence of a party, the press
refects the interests of powerful individuals and groups.
In military regimes that have supplanted parties,
submerged pareallelism may exist. Thus in Ghana,Greece,
Indonesia, Nigeria and Peru no-party systems exist in whici
the organization and goals of the press-continue to parallel
a previous party system, though the parallelism probably
cannot be completed.
The parallelism is generally held to be relevant up
to the present (Royer, 1975), though it has been observed
that since the end of the Second World War party loyalities in
the advanced capitalist or democratic countries have grown
looser. In Se,ymour-Ure's words: The same democratic values
that all papers to parties make'them suspicious of governments
and perhaps because the functions of government proliferated
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after 1945, the number of paper declined, papers came to place
tk.eir critical attitudes to government, at the expense if
neccessary of loyalty to party."(,oymour-Ure, p. 165)
Hoyer et al observed that depolitization in the press by
means of a broader and more detached reporting of political
events has become something of an international trend. However,
there still exists a firm division between the bourgeois and the
socialist press in Scandinavia. "Bourgeoise papers are not by
any means likely to support socialist parties and vice versa"
(Hoyer et al, 1975, n. 29)
The pace at which the press approaches neutralism is
even less marked in the developing countries where political
contests have long been part of their histories. The commercial
press has surfaced along with the expansion in economy but
political orientation remains a significant feature (Omu 1978).
In the last section, we have pointed out that Hong Kong
is what Harris called an administrative no-party state.
However, its media are by no means detached from identifi-
cation with the distant parties in Peking and Taipei--
CCP and KMT. This close parallelism between the press and
Chinese parties is unique in that it grows not out of local
politics but is a side extension of modern Chinese history.
Though there.are signs that some press, under the pressure
of commercialization, are becoming, less partisan in their
outlook, the kind of neutralism that Seymour-Ur. e talks about
is far from being a dominating feature of the media scene.
Being aware of the possible political cc:aplications
that this parallelism may bring about, the Hong Kong
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Government sets the limits in its laws. The laws of Hong
Kong-statesthat it shall be an offence to print or publish-
matter tending to induce people to commit an offence or
become a member of an unlawful society or of a political
group established outside the Colony adherence to which
within the Colony has by virtue of an enactment been
declared by the Governor in Council to be prejudicial to
the security of the Colony or to the prevention of crime
or to the maintaince within the Colony of public order or
safety.9 A survey of the ordinances shows that Hong Kong's
mass media are hedged, directly or indirectly, with legalities
and that, if the law means every bit what it says and if the
Governor in Council, the courts and police are to translate
zealously the letter and spirit of the ordinances and
regulations into action, Hong Kong's mass media, especially
the press, would be drastically affected (Shen, 1972: p.77-78).
The Hong Kong Government, following the British tradition
.of press freedom, has been scoring only a few if any martyr to
a free press under the almost 150 years of colonial rule (Clayton
in Lent, 1971:P.56).In a report published by the International
Press Institute in 1977 Hong Kong ranks second only to Japan
as the area which enjoys the highest degree of press freedom
in Asia. 10 To start 'a publication is easy in Hong Kong: the
publisher needs to pay a safety deposit of HK$10,000 or
providing two guarantors acceptable to' the Government, in
addition to an annual registration fee of only HK$100
(Clayton, 1971: p. 58) This partially accounts for Hong
Kong's being a hotbed of publications. The statistics
released by the late Director of Information Services, M. Slimming., i..
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1979 will be astonishing to the westerners who have few news-
papers at their home cities:
There are about 100 Chinese deilies. Seventeen major
papers have a combined circulation of 1.2 million there are
6 Chinese afternoon papers with a total circulation of about
.32 million and a large number of so-called mosquito news-
papers which concentrate on horse racing and dog tips, stories
and serials, though they contain very little 'news.' The
major papers, covering the whole spectrum of political views,
are respected and widely read for their news content. Four
have a circulation which exceeds 100,000 and two are over the
,250,000 mark that is to say, 2 Chinese newspapers each has a
circulation greater than that of the 3 English language papers
added together. In addition to publications, there are 4 TV
channels (2 English and 2 Chinese), and at peak viewing time
as many as 2 million people may be watching one particular
programme.' Two radio stations, each with services in both
languages means in effect 7 radio channels (Slimming, 1978: p24).
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Table 3.1 Number of Publications and Chinese Language
Newspaers in Hong Kong (1953-1980)



























*Total number of publications includes newspapers and magazines
Some figures are missing from the Annual Reports of Government
which are the data source of the table above.
(The table above is partly adapted from Lai-ping Mui, Reasons
for the Circulation Decline of the Kung SheunR Daily News,
Undergraduate Paper, Department of Journalism and Communication,
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1979.)
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Over a period of 30 years, the number. of publications
and papers increase at a very steady rate (Table 3.1).
Since 1972, the number of newspapers has become quite
stationary around 100 which probably signifies a point of
saturation under the existing social conditions. However,
the turnover rate of the mosquito papers is very high.
Hong Kong being a colony to the south of China, its media
development in the past 150 years has been influenced-by
political changes in the mainland. Prior to the downfall
of Ching Dynasty, revolutionaries and r'onstitutional
monarchists set up papers in Hong Kong along with the colonial
city of Shanghai which provided them with a free base to speak
to the Chinese at home and abroald. To reform or not to reform?
To revolt or not to revolt? These were some of the major
questions facing the political-oriented press at the time.
Of course, there were the commercial press which touched only
local affairs (Lin, 1977 Tsang, 1969). There were two major
reasons to account for the prevalence of political newspapers
in Hong Kong as well as in China (Tsang, 1969: p.193): First,
newspapers are a product of hitorical. conditi ons. At the
turn of the century, China was repeatedly hummiliat ed by western
powers. It was the revolutionaries like Dr. Sun and reformist
Kang Yau-wei and Liang Chi-chiao who first recognised the use
of newspaper to mobilize public opinion and propagate their
thoughts. Second, intellectuals in China used to mingle with
politics. Many of the early journalists were intellectuals
held on this tradition and spoke up on political affairs in
newspapers.
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In the protracted struggle between KMT and CCP and in
the Sino-Japanese War, Hong Kong became a haven for journalists
who could not freely express themselves at home. Communists
like Chou En-lai and Chiao Kuan-hua had stayed in Hong Kong
doing newspaper work. KMT-had its followers in Hong Kong
too. Back in 1925, the pro-KMT Kung Sheung Daily was set up
in view of the upsurge of the Communist people (Mui, 1979).
In 1939, KMT established the Kuo-min Daily which quickly
engaged itself in polemics with Communist sympathizers like
Wah Sheung Daily, and the Bright Daily (Tsang, 1969: p. 432)
The interparty struggle between CCP and KMT continues
up to the present and has left obvious marks in Hong Kong's
press system which to some extent is a residual microcosm of
the elapsed China. Some of the papers are organizationally and
financially linked to either party some are politically less
involved and are-linked in their goal orientation. According
to a survey done by Taiwan's Overseas Chinese Association in HK. in
1963 (Tsang, 1966: p. 739), there were 49 Chinese newspapers,
and magazines out of which 36 were classified to be pro-KMT or
centrist, 5 Communist and 8 sympathetic towards the Communists.
Some of the important pro-KMT papers include Hong Kong Times,
"Kung Sheung Daily", "Sing TAo Daily", "Wah Kiu Daily and"
"Expre-ss Daily". The Communist papers include "Wen Wei Daily,"
"Ta Kung Daily", "New Evening Daily". Papers sympathetic to
Communists include "Ching Daily" and Commercail Daily.
To both parties, Hong Kong is a good battlefield for a
media war, with*the Hong Kong Government keeping the rules of
the game. They are ready to jump on each other whenever there
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is a chance. To woo the citizens to their cause is also one
of their major objectives.
That probably explains why Hong Kong's press has tradi-
tionally been categorized into two classes: the political press
and the commercial press (Lin, 1977:p.62 Tsang, 1969: p. 282).
In fact there exists dialectical relationship between the press's
strength of political ties and its degree of commercialization.
The more commercial, the less political, and vice versa. So
party identification on a continuum polarized by CCP and KMT
is an important scale for measuring the ideological orientations
of the press and its journalists. The Hong Kong Government is
not included in my scale because the scale alone is sufficient
to help us make.educated guesses about the press's'journalistic
paradigms.on protests. Also, the scale can provide us with a
reference point for the press's attitudes towards the Government.
In between the.party-linked papers are the commercial press
which are politically less partisan or are about in the center,
if not slightly right of the center. It is not in their interest
or ideology to identify too closely with either party. Neither
can they afford alienating the readers by committing themselves
to a particular party. Instead, objectivity, impartiality and
independence are the more important characteristics that they
boast of. The,centrist press survive and prosper on the rapidly
expanding. economy of Hong Kong and its formidable advertising
industry. Their preoccupations with'profits do not forbid them
to comment and report Chinese politics.which is after all an
important concern of Hong Kong's 98% Chinese population. Ming
Pao is a good example of the centrist press. It criticizes both
the Taiwan and Peking Governments. Its political ideologies
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are built on liberal values such as democracy, freedom and some
sort of neutrality. It devotes a lot of space to coverage on local
affairs. At the same time, it is a widely authority
in reporting and commenting on Chinese politics. These centrist
papers are very much a local product catering to the cultural
taste of the citizens at large.
The press system of Hong Kong as such is to some extent
sustained by the journalism-education system that is supplying
it with new blood. The journalism schools in Taiwan and the
KMT-linked Chu Hai College in Hong Kong have been an important
source of fresh manpower. About 24% of Hong Kong's city reporters
are graduates from these institutions where the kind of profes-
sional principles taught is no more than a revised version of
western journalism.11 What is extraordinary is the KMT-oriented
political education and social.ization they receive. So the KMT-l.inkff
papers are expected to recruit these Taiwan-trained journalism
graduates who are supposed to have similar rightist political
outlooks 2 Another possible reason for these graduates to stay
with the rightist press is that their degrees are not recognised
by the Hong Kong Government this means that they do not have
too many choices, resultin4 in a relatively low occupational
mobility.
There are three non-party-linked journalism' schools in
Hong Kong which account for the education of about 28/ of Hong
Kong's reporters.11 Their teachers are western-trained and
textbooks are American. The social responsibility theory of
the press-is the prevalent theory around the journalism depart-
ments. The faculty's political inclination on the average is
towards the right which is in stark contrast with the liberal
or slightly leftist outlook of the whole campus which has been
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radicalized through the seventies by surges of student
movements. At one point in 1978 both the faculties and student
body o f'the Chinese University of Hong Kong rallied against the
Government's plan to reorganize the University. It-is expected
that graduates from these local colleges will be liberal, if
not leftist in political orientation. "Rightists" or students
sympathetic to KMT will be rare. The majority will probably
be recruited by thecentrist and rightward-centrist papers
and a few leftists by the CCP-linked press.
Since reporters are further from the press's pasty-linkage,
if any, than their management, it is expected that there will
be a general discrepancy between the reporter's responses to
a controversial social protest even if both have similar politica:
outlooks. McCombs et al (1979: p. 98) have listed a few factors
that 'contribute to the relative autonomy of the journalists.
They include vague press policy and loose management which
give enough room for maneuvering professional ethics.and
colleagues' support which provide constant sources of strength,
the time factor which lets the journalists rush without
detailed supervision and competition with other newspapers
which makes an omission or slanting an expression possible.
All these factors, possibly coupled with others, are expected
to lend the reporters a freer hand than their supervising
editors in reporting social protests.
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3.4 Summary
Drawing on Kuhn's conception of "paradigm", Berger and
Luckmann's sociology of knowledge and Marsh's research on
protests, I have theorized the existence of the journalistic
paradigm" in general and the "journalistic paradigm on protest
in particular. The journalistic paradigm on protest is
operationalized into six major components: support of the
government's suppressive policies on protest, concern for
social order, politicization, stereotyping, externalization
of causes and appeal to traditional codes of behaviour.
The journalistic paradigm on protest, largely a product
of political ideology has been cast against the background of
Hong Kong's political culture and press structure. Protest,
a legal form of social action in Hong Kong, is received and perceives
differently by journalists or papers with different paradigms.
Political ideology or party identification is. an important
criterion in differentiating such paradigms. The reactions
of the press towards. protests depend on the nature and target
of the protests. If it is political in nature, party preference
will become the demarcation line. Protests that are to the
advantage of one party will be supported and hailed by the
papers affiliated with that party. Of course, they will be
attacked or neglected by the rivalling partisan papers. In
such cases, the centrists would probably incline slightly
towards the right or simply stay aloof. As argued in the
foregoing sections, protests have been historically and
ideologically associated with CCP rather than KMT, it is
expected that along a continuum from the right, as represented
46
by KMT in the Hong Kong context, to the left as represented
by CCP, the former is characterised by a "protest-paranoid"
and a negative orientation towards protest and pertinent
social objects such as radical pressure groups, while the
latter is characterised by a "protestism" and positive
orientation. The centrist is typified by a reformist
outlook and a more detached attitude. This general pattern
is expected to apply even in non-political social protests
that are not led by the Communists.
Social stability is the upper bound for all kinds of
social actions. Therefore,' any non-partisan protest that
is perceived to have the potential of rocking the boat is
bound to be rejected by all the parties and the people at
large. However, different journalistic paradigms on protest
are likely to set the upper bound at different levels and
to perceive a single protest at varying anvles and arrive
at dissimilar conclusions. It is expected that the under-
lying features of these paradigms on protest will manifest
themselves in response to a concrete case, especially if the
case is. radical in form but ambiguous in nature.
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CHAPTER 4
HYPOTHESES, RESEARCH METHODS AND FINDINGS
One way to know how the press's journalistic paradigm on
0
protests is structured is to interview the editorial writers
and press owners. But since politics, esneciall,y when personal
political identification is involved,is -too sensitive a subject
to avoid in conversation with strangers, it is unlikely that
many of the potential interviewees will be frank and concrete
even if they,-grant a meeting. The editors and press owners,
not to say the general population, are not too familiar with
academic research and seem to be suspicious when they become
the research subjects. It came to our knowledge that two
major newspapers have forbidden their reporters from answering
questionnaires sent out by the university students. So,
interviewing these people does not guarantee that my questions
will be answered. I therefore resort to content analysis,
supplemented with interviews. Given more time, I could
have done content analysis on a number of cases. Now I
content myself with one carefully chosen case-- the Jubilee
School Affair which promises to reveal the underlying features
of the press's journalistic paradigm on protest.
The methodological approach used resembles the critical
events approach as expounded by Kraus'ct-al. (1975). Most event
analysis have been impact studies of events on societies and
individuals. Kraus et al,advise that attention should be
given to the.study of particular types of messages about public
events, saying we need a. better understanding of how various
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media transmit such events and how different types of individuals
attent to and use the various types of dramatic messages
transmitted by the various media (Kraus et at in Chaffce 1975:p.207
In response, we focus our study on the messages transmitted
by the press and how and why they presented the event as such.
In this chapter I shall first lay down the hypotheses
and explain how the variables are measured. Then I shall
give a. brief account of the Jubilee School Affair and 'explicate
why it fits my purpose. Finally, the findings will be presented
and discussed.
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4.1 Hypotheses and Measurements
As argued in the previous chapters, political ideology
or its operand, party identification, isa significant, if
not the most significant determinant of the journalistic
paradigm on protest which, in turn,'can be operationalised
into six major components, namely, support of suppressive
measures, concern for social order, politicization, stereo-
typing,externalization-of causes and appeal to traditional
codes of behaviour. 13 Political ideyol.o y or party identificatic
of the press is the independent variable and the attributes
of the journalistic paradigm on protest forms the dependent
variable. Based on the arguments in Chapter 2 and 3, I
propose the following hypotheses:
1. The propensity of the rightist newspapers to support
the government's suppressive policies on protest is
higher-than that of the leftist newspapers.
2. The rightist newspapers tend to show greater concern
for social order than the leftist newspapers.
3. The rightist newspapers are more inclined-than the
leftist newspapers in politicizing a protest.
4. The rightist newspapers' tendency to discredit a
protest by•stereotyping is greater than that of the
leftist newspapers.
5. The rightist newspapers' tendency to externalize
the causes of a protest is higher than that of the
leftist news-pipers.
6. The rightist newspapers' tendency to appeal to
traditional codes of behaviour is greater than that
of the leftist newspapers.
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Table 4.1 A Summary of the Major Hypotheses and Measurements
Operands of the Dependent VariableExpected relation Dependent VariableIndependent
Variable Attributes of the Journalistic Thematic StatementsParadigm on Protest
The Guovernnrn llu 5 iuedz:)ul co wGl G 11G1iG.7' -J or Lne maintenance, oI school peace/ 5Oe±d
order/the dignity of education.
Positive Support of official policies The Government's sending out warning letters and closing the school were timely
measures
The Government's measures were fair/well thought.
The protesters were disrupting soclai peace/social order.
The protests could be a spark that might kindle a great prairie/ They should be
stopped before they spread.Positive Concern for social order
The Governmnet's determined policies could intimidate the potential violators of
the authority structure of echools.
The Government should prevent this from happening again.
The school had been infiltrated by leftists/political activists.Rightist
PositiveParty Politicization of the event The event had a political background.
Identification
The event had something to do with the local RevoJiutionary Marxist Union.
The protesters' behaviour resembles that of rebels in the 1967 riots/or CulturalPositive Stereotying Revolution
The protesting teachers were activated by selfish utlerior motives. For example:Positive Externalization of causes The teachers wanted to take over the school.
The protesting students were blind followers/They were being used.
The protesting teachers and students were defying hierachical order/The low should
respect the high.
Positive Appeals to traditional codes of Teaching and learning were the jobs of the teachers and students who should end
behaviour their radical activities and return to the classroom.
The protesters should have learned lessons from the codes of behavior in Chinese
traditional culture.
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Each of the six attributes of the journalistic paradigm
on protest is further operationalized into categories or
thematic statements (Table 4.1) against which the press's
coverage of the Jubilee School Affair in editorials, news
(content), headlines and letters to the editors
analysed. These thematic categories are registered on an
absence or presence basis.
In addition, the dependent variable includes an overall
stand which is holistic measure of the position of a sample
piece, be it an editorial, a headline, a letter, or a piece
of plain news. The overall stand is an ordinal measure with
three grades: pro-Government(ant,-protesters), neutral and
anti-Government(pro-protesters). The overall stand of a sample
piece is determined by reading the position of the writer of
the piece. between the lines. Here are some of the major
principles to be followed:
1. In an afiinibn piece like an editorial or a letter,
the pro-Government arguments are weighed against the pro-
protester argument as a whole to see if one outweights the
other. In cases where the pro and con arguments are balanced,
or when it is difficult to determine the basic position of the
writer, it will be rated neutral.
2. In cases of news and headlines, a distinction is made
between.the positions of each of the writers and the direction
of the information itself. For example, a piece of information
in news can be favourable to the protesters but the writer can
frameitup in an unfavourable way. In this case, the position
of writer is unsympathetic towards the rebels but the information
is. It is the position of the writer that concerns me in measure-
ment,
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3. Since news and headlines are by nature more
Objective than editoria1 ls or 1otters. it is
sometimes not so easy to detect the writer's position by
reading the face value of the words. Connotations of the
the words used serve as a major hint in such cases.
For example, in Chinese the words " 攪事” (stirring) gives
a bad connotation while “抗議” (protest) is more neutral.
It is expected that the rightist newspapers will be
associated more with the pro-Government overall stand than
the leftist newspapers.
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The independent variable is the political ideology or
party identification of newspapers which in Hong Kong can be
observed with the following indicators:
1. Place of registration: Besides Hong Kong, KMT-linked papers
should have registered in Taiwan too the CCP-linked press
in China.
2. Baseline of the calendar: KMT-linked papers should use 1911
--the year in which the Republic was founded- as the baseline.
Leftist and centrist papers use the western calendar.
3. National reference: KMT-linked press would refer to China.
as Mainland China, The Mainland, or simply CCP, the
centrist press would call it likewise the leftist would
say The Chinese Communist Party when referring to the
party itself, China or Our Country when referring to
the c.ountry.
4. National Day-Observance: The rightist press editorializes
on October 10 in-celebration, the leftist on October 1.
The centrist probably stays silent on both days.
5. The assessment given by the reporters working in each of
the press: On a six-point scale, the reporters are to evaluate
identification. One registers the strongest KMT-
identification. or the least CCP-identification; six
denotes the least .K1tiiT-identif.icatton or the 'strongest
CCP-identification.14 So this is an or.di.nal measure by
which we can compare the strength and direction of a
newspaper.
Table 4.2: Locations of the Newspapers' Political Ideology along a Left-Right Continuum
Average scorePlace ofNational DayNational ReferenceCalendarcressParty
of Press'RegistrationObservanceBaselineIdenti- Political ID
fication
1.0Editorialized Taiwan &1. People's Republic is refer-1911, theHK TimesRightis H. K.red as "CCP /The Mainland" on Oct., 10,first year
1978 in/Mainland China.of the
celebrationChinese
1.02. The Republic is referredKung Sheung Republic
to as China/ Our Country'
Free China
2.03. CCP is CCP/Bandit's
Sing Tao
Party
1. PRC is referred as PRC/ I H. K.No celebra- 3.0
WesternSing PaoCentrist
tion observedChina /Mainland China/Calenda
Oct., 1 and" CCP"
Oct., 10,1978




6.0H. K,1. PRC is PRC/ China/ Our EditorializedT a Kung Pao WesternLeftist Country/ Motherland n Oct., 1,Calendar
1978 in
I2. CCP is CCP 6.0H.K.celebrationWen Wei Pao
China




Crosschecking the choice of calendar baseline, the way
China is called, the observance of the national. days and
place of registration (Table 4.2) we can classify the press
into three categories: (1) the UT-linked or the rightist
newspapers- Hong Kong Times, Kung Sheung Daily and Sing Tao
Daily (2) the centrist newspapers- Sing Pao, Ming Pao and
South China Morning Post (SCMP) and (3) the CCP-linked or
leftist newspapers- Ta Kung Daily and Wen Wei Daily. This
catergorization of the newspapers agree with that by the
independent assessment given by the journalists working in
each of the newspapers (Rightist- scores I and 2 Centrist-
scores 3 and 4 Leftist- scores 5 and 6).15 These eight newspapers
are chosen for content analysis on the basis of their representa-
tiveness along the continuum from left to right. So the party
identification of the newspapers is treated as an ordinal
variable.
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4.2 The Case of the Jubilee School Affair
The Jubilee School Affair started in 1977 and ended in
1978. It began with the exposition of a Catholic school's
financial irregularities and developed into a series of
protests by the teachers, students and pressure groups in
opposition to the suppressive measures of the school and
Government authorities. The case is chosen for the following
reasons:
First, it meets the precondition in our theorizing. We
have argued that the underlying features of the journalistic
paradigm on protests will emerge in face of an ambiguous
situation. The nature of the event was not at all clear when
it first called the attention of the public. Both journalists
and the population were surprised to find the teenage girls and
teachers of a Catholic high school, well-known for their.
passivity and obedience, rose against their'school authorities
and then the Church and Government by staging sit-ins, sleep-
ins, demonstrations, petitions and other forms of protest.
They had not witnessed anything exactly like this before. The
forms of protest might have been familiar during the 1967 Riot
but the content was not. This presented-an ambigous situation
to the.. journalists and people at large. It is expected
that this amhiguity would elicit projections from media workers'
journalistic paradigm on protest in their efforts to define the
situation which ironically, was finally found to be non-political
in nature.
Second, although the case evolved more than a year, the
climax lasted two months when the dynamics of the event made up
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most the headlines, thus providi.nc a valuable opportunity
for in-depth content analysis.
Third, the case constitutes a microcosm of Hong Kong's
quadropartie-public-opinion system among the people, the
media, the pressure groups and the Government. All four
components of the quadro system were set in an agitated state
which is essential for the dynamics involved to reveal them-
selves in bits and patterns. Interest groups spoke out loud.
They formed coalitions. They petitioned. They made news.
They mobilized the media. By all means, they tried to press
on the Government. The media responded. They took stands.
They changed stands. Some medz.a people even got.-personally
involved. The general population debated about the case.
They wrote letters to the press. Some rallied with the
pressure groups, and some with the Government. The Government
made policy.. It tried to sway public opinion. Finally, it
had to. make compromise. The dynamics involved is so abundant
that a case study is expected to be fruitful.
For a detailed account of the Jubilee School Affair, the
reader is advised to read Appendix I or Appendix 2.
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4.3 Sampling
The event was divided into three stages, each of which
was sampled after the following fashion:
First, the development stage: From the exposition of
financial irregularities on February 1, 1977 to the closure
of the school on May 14,' 1978. Many happenings in the first
year were private interactions between the teachers and the
Government and the school authorities, so there was not much
media coverage. The two sit-ins staged by the students on
June 9 and June 10, 1977 began to attract the attention of
the media. All went quiet until May 1978 when a.series of
protest broke out. Since the news coverage was not evenly
distributed, the days right after the first two sit-ins
(i.e. June 10 and June 11, 1977) were sampled to ensure that
there was news material for content analysis.
Second, the. climax of the event as marked by the closure
of the school by Education Department on May 14, 1978 and
ended by the mass rally held in support of the teachers
and students on May 28: The period was densely dotted with
protests. So starting with May 15, one day after the closure
of the school, every other day of the period was sampled.
The last stage of the event began with the mass rally
held on May 28, 1978 and ended with the release of the interim
report by the Government's Inquiry Committee on July 14, 1978.
During this period, the rally was the biggest event which was
followed by sparse protests and activities. The unprecedented
mass rally, joined by some 10,000 people, was believed to
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have great impact on the media, the Government, the people
at large and the protesters themselves. So every other day
of the week following the rally was sampled: Nav 29 31 It
June 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. Three other dnvs, JuIv 8, 10, 15 were
added to the sample because something rel:Htively significant
occurred on the days. preceding- each of the dates gust
mentioned. It is meaningless to saample tbe days that did
not carry news on the Jubilee Affair.
As stated earlier, eight newspapers are included in my
sample on the basis of their representativeness along the
continuum from left to right. The rightist newspapers
are Hong Kong Times, Kung Sheiing Daiiv and Sing SingTao Dai1y
the centrist newspapers are Sing Pao, Minor Pao and South
China Morning Post and the leftist newspapers are Ta Kung
Daily and Wen .Wei Daily.
The forms of coverage samnl.ed included editorials, news
(content), headlines and letters to the editors. Since
editorials were scattered throughout the per.i.od, a comprehensive
-survey was attempted. News, headlines and letters were
analysed. according to the days.
Intervi.ewing is a si)pp].ementary method. My interviewees
include: (1) the news editor from each.of the newspapers
in my sample (2) three reporters from each of the three
Categorical newspapers C3) pressure group leaders and
protesting teachers and (4) Government .Information Officers.
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4.4 Findings
In this section I shall first present the general
information, then test each hypothesis one by one. Some
relevant findings will also be discussed.
As argued in Section 4.1, the overall stand of a sample
piece, be it an editorial, news, headline or letter, is an
ordinal variable from pro-Government (anti-protesters), neutral
to anti-Government (pro-protesters). The measurement of the
variable has been discussed in the same section and I am not
going to repeat it here. The political ideology of a newspaper
is represented by its party identification which, as pointed
out in the same section, is also an ordinal vari ahl P.
So, in correlations between the overall stand and the press's
party identification, the assymetric Sommer's d is chosen as
the statistic for comparisons.
Table 4.3 Pro-Government'overall stand By Newspapers'
Rightist Party Identification By Form of Coverpge
Forms of Coverage N Sommer's d X2 df p
News 44.6.2347 4 <.01
Editorials
.759 60.0 4 <01
Letters
.3 17.074 4 < .01
Headlines
.1342 38 .9 4 < 01
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The pro-Government overall stands are crosstabulated
with the newspapers's rightist party identification with
the forms of coverage (editorials, news, headline and letter)
being controlled and the results are listed in Table 4.3.
I have hypothesised that the newspapers' rightist political
deology is associated more with the pro-Government
.stand than the leftist. The outcomes agree with my expectation.2
The correlations between pro-Government overall stand and
the newspapers' rightist party identification are the
strongest with editorials (Sommer's d= .7) and letters (d= .3)
which are opinionated. in nature. Being more "objective
in nature, news (d= .2) and headlines (d= .1) show relatively
weaker correlations.
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Table 4.4: Stands towards the Government by Potitical





ID News Editorials Letters Headlines
Pro- 12.5 10097.4 15.3
Government
Rightist Neutral 85.6 2.6 0.0 83.7
Anti- 1.9 0.0 0.0 1.0
Government
Pro- 0.7 8.8 34.-1 3.7Government
Centrist Neutral 85.1 46.6 12.2 80.3
Anti-. 14.2 44.6 53.7 16.0
Government
Pro- 0.0 25.07.4 1.1
Government
Leftist Neutral
.76.8 35.8 8.3 92.4
Anti- 23.2 56.8 66.7 6.5
Government
Total No. of Items (N) 347 59 74 342
(Rightist) (30%) (64%) (12%) (30%)
(Centrist) (43%) (27%) (55%) (43%)





Table 4,4 gives a more detailed breakdown. A number of
points are worth commenting:
Editorials:
The correlation between the overall stand of editorials and
the press's party identification runs as high as .70 because
the editorial writers are closer to the policy source of the
press. The press policy towards protest, if any, appears
to be the most evident in editorials the stands of which
pretty much define the line for other forms of media coverage.
The party-linked papers are not hesitant in taking positions
while the centrist press seem to be more reluctant.. About
47% of the centrist editorials take the neutral stand. In
face of ambiguity, probably they tend to wait and see if hard
evidence arises while the party-linked press readily project
from their journalistic paragigm on protests.
News and Headlines:
With regard to news, the correlation between the overall
stand with the press's party identification drops to .20. This
has been expected as the reporters, writers of the news, are
.less ideological and. less experience-bound than their-press,
supervisors. Another equally important factor.is that the
nature of news as defined by most of the journalists prevent
their reports from being influenced by their personal political
inclination. They are trained,to report events objectively.
Fabrications of news run the risk of being sued.
The corresponding correlation for headlines i only .1,
almost less than that for news by almost .1. It was expected
that the relative higher positions of headliners/editors would
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be more exhibitive of the influence of the press's party
identification. About 59% of the news items in the leftist
press are evaluated to be pro-protesters while only 38.0%
of the headlines are so graded.. Fifty-five percent of the
headlines are graded as neutral. This means that the headline
editors are more reluctant than reporters in asserting a
positive attitude towards the rebels and tend to maintain a
centrist position. A leftist editor attributed this surprising
result to two factors: First, the headline editors, being
more loyal to the party-policy in keeping good. Sino-British
relation, are less inclined than young reporters to antagonise
the Government, especially at the inception when they were not
sure of the direction the event took. Secondly, the editors
tend to adhere to the safety principle when headlin.i.r,f. They
wanted to be sure of the nature of the event before taking
sides, if ever. A wrong judgment may mean political error
to them
Letters
The corresponding correlation for letters is .3. Not
all the papers.have the letter-to-the-editor column. The
rightist papers printed letters on an irregular basis. 100%
of the letters printed by them agreed to the.papers' stand.
Neither was. there a regular letters column in the leftist
papers, 66.7% of those letters are pro-protesters, the rest
being split between neutral-and pro-Government. According
to an anyonymous leftist editor, they did receive a few
letters disagreeing with their stands and they printed them
to give.an impression of being more. objective. He also said
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that the letters column was created in the beat of the event
as a less conspicuous and indirect means of mobilizing public
opinion for the protesters and as a channel to air the reader's
voice. The instrumental nature of the letters column was
evidenced by the fact that it was dropped when the event
was over.
Out of the three centrist papers, South China Morning
Post used to have a letter column Ming Pao created'one in
the midst of the event. SCMP's editor admitted that they
had been receiving bags and bags of letters, most of which
were either. against the Government's policies or pro-protesters.
.The-creation of the letters column in Ming Pao, adcordi.ng to
its proprietor and editorial writer, Mr. Cha Lian-yunp,, was
prompted by the readers' need for a forum on the event. 16At
one point, the press was overwhelmed by letters all on the
ongoing event.that the editor had to remind the readers to
write on other issues.
The centrist press printed the largest'number of letters,
41 altogether. Among them, 53.7% are pro-protesters, 34.1%
pro-Government and only 12.2% neutral. It seems that letter-
write
usually have a stand of their own. Positionless
people seldom take up their pens. It is believed that some
of these letters are written by the protesters and supporting
participants who formally advocated letter-writing as a
combating tactic. Another possible reason is that the editors
prefer letters with poisitions. to detached, balanced arguements.
which are usually thought to be less interesting
The letters column, besides being a forum for the readers,
also serves as a supplementary medium for clearing questions
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on the issue in question. A qualitative survey of the
letters shows that all the participating parties in the
event are to some extent held accountable to queries from
the readers or from each other.
Homegeneity of Views:
die homogeneity of views in a paper is high with the
party-linked press. All the opinionated pieces seem to
be very consistent in stand and tolerance of rivalling
views is slim. The centrist press is a forum where both
sides can have a chance to air their opinions. About half
of the letters are pro-protesters, giving more than 20% to
the opposite views. In other words, diversification of view
is possible in the centrist press.
Advocacy:
That advocacy increases with leftist party identification
is borne out by the figures in Tab1.P under the news column.
76.8% of the news written-by the leftist reporters are classified
to be neutral. The corresponding percentages for the centrist
and rightist are 85.1 and 85.6 respectively.
67
Now I shall present data relevant to each of the major
hypothesis. The journalistic paradigm on protest has been
operationalized into six components each of which is measured
by revelvant thematic statements. (Table 4.1) The occurrence
of these thematic statements are crosstabulated with the
newspapers' rightist party identification with the form of
coverage being controlled. The results are summarized. in
Table 4.5.
Table 4.5 Attributes of the journalistic paradigm on protest as a function of the newspapers'




ships d X2 df pparadigm on d X2 df pd X2 df p d X2 df p
Protest
ns 1 25.2 6 <.01 nsnsSupport for positive
official policies
ns5 14.2 4 <.o11 17.3 nsConcern for social 4 <.01
order
1 8.9 2 <. 01 nsnsPoliticization of 5 16.7 6 <.01
the event
ns ns nsSterotyping .1 22.6 2 <.01
ns.3 15.2 4 <.01nsExternalization of
.5 14.2 4 <.01
the causes
Appeals to tradition-
nsns .2 7.2 2 <.03nsal codes of behaviour
Page 68
69
The first hypothesis which states that the propensity
of the rightist newspapers to siuppport the government's
suppressive policies on protest is confirmed under the
letter column but not in editorials, news and headlines.
By substituting the dependent variable in this hypothetical
statement (the newspapers' propensity to support the
government's suppressive policies) with a surrogate
variable (the newspapers' propensity to criticize the
government's suppressive policies) which measures the
same journalistic attribute from the opposite direction, the
hypothesis will read: The rightist newspapers are less
inclined than the leftist newspapers to criticize the
government's suppressive policies. In this case the tendency
Ito criticize the government's suppressive policies is measured
by these thematic statements: (1) The Government's measures
had ridden the students of their right to study- which should
be restored (2) The Government's measures were suppressive/
!bureaucratic/colonial and (3) The Government's policies were
unreasonable and could not solve the problem. The surrogate
hypothesis is confirmed in editorial (Sommer's d=-.5, X2= 23.9,
2
df 6 p< .01), letters (d= -.1 X= 18.9, df= 6 p .01)
and. news( d=-. 2 X2= 23.9 df =6 p< .01)
but not in headlines. All in all, the hypothesis that the
rightist newspapers are more inclined than leftist newspapers
,in supporting suppressive policies on protest is confirmed by
the findings.
1.
The second hypoethesis states that the rightist news-
papers tend to show greater concern for social order than
the leftist newspapers.. Table 4.5 shows that this hypothesis
Is-confirmed in news and editorials but is .not significantly
I i held in fetters and headlines.
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The third hypothesis states that the rightist news-
papers are more inclined than the leftist newspapers in
politicizing a protest. The hypothetical relation is found
to be held in editorial and letters but not in news and
headlines (Table 4.5).
The fourth hypothesis which states that the rightist
newspapers' tendency to discredit a protest by stereotyping
is greater than that of the leftist newspaper is confirmed
only in letters (Table 4.5).
The fifth hypothesis which states that the rightist
newspapers' tendency to externalize the causes of a protest
is higher than that of the leftist newspapers is confirmed
in editorials and letters but not in news and headlines
(Table 4.5).
The sixth. hypothesis, which states that the rightist
newspapers' tendency to appeal to traditional codes of
behaviour is greater than that of the leftist newspapers.
is confirmed only in letters (Table 4-5).
As a whole, each hypothesis is confirmed by at least
one form of coverage. The hypothetical relations are the
most strongly held in opionion articles like editorials
or letters but.not in objective pieces like news and
headlines. -One may,raise the question that the letters
are written by the readers and are thus not reflections of
the editors' orientations towards the protest.
At the beginningof this section I have stated that the
overall stand of the letters agree very much with that of
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Ithe newspapers in which they are published. A leftist
editor confessed that they considered the publication
of letters favouring protesters as an indirect means of
supporting the rebels. All the news editors of the papers
sampled in this study said at interviews, they had policies
governing the publication of letters. So I can safely
assume that the kind of letters published must be,
at least to some extent, a reflection of the editors'
orientation towards the issue in question. Based on the
correlations given in Table 4.5 under the editorial and
letter columns, I can therefore conclude that all the
hypotheses about the relations between the newspapers'
journalistic paradigms on protest and their political
ieni fi nati nn ara basically rnnfirmed
To illustrate how the press's journalistic paradigms
on protest operate in response to the issue, the following
quotations are taken from the editorials with respect
to the major features of 'the paradigms:
1. On supporting supppressive policies
We believe that the existing campus 'anarchy',
if left undeterred,'would possibly develop into social
uproar. This is why the Education Department'.s
(determined policy to close the school is far-sighted
land'is in the interest of the people. The policy
should. be supported by all responsible citizens.
(rightist Kung Sheung Daily, 24/5/78)
The. leftist newspapers were more critical of the
Government'ssuppressive policies. Right after the
closure of the school, the leftist Ta Kung Daily
remarked: The educational circle was concerned
about the closure of the school many people were
72
shaken to find the Government setting such a bad precedent.
........ Is it really true that closing the school is the
only effective method of resolvi.np the conflict? At any
event the interest of the students and parents should take
priority over other considerations. "(Ta Kung Daily, 15/5/78)
2. Politicization and Externalization of Causes:
No sooner had the first two sit-ins occurrred than the
rightist HK Times rushed in to define the event in its own way:
We should not spare the tiny clique of subversive teachers
who never stop trying to let down the wishes of the great
majority of*parents and teachers. These seeming teachers
are in fact a small group with political. and organizational
background....... They carry out political and propaps.nda
activities in school. Their aim is to coopt teachers,
deceive students, control the school, and finally to break
up the whole educational system and uproot a free society
like Hong Kong. (righist Hongkong Times, 19/6/77
While the rightist press was trying to politicize and
externalize the cause of the Jubilee Affair, the leftist
tried to define it as a reflection-of the internal contradiction
embedded in Hong Kong's educational system. In an editorial on
May 26, 1978,,the leftist Wen Wei Daily remarked: ....anyone
who has first hand knowledge of the Jubilee School Affair knows
that it is nothing more than a dispute between two kinds of
educational philosophy." The editorial writer continued to
argue that the liberal and inspiring teaching methods
advocated by the rebellious teachers was a reaction to the
dominant traditional duck-stuffing" or rote-learning methods
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he maintained that the Jubi1ee Affair only signified the onset.
of a surging tide to reform education which was originated from
the west.
3. Stereotyping:
We have argued that experience with past similar events
provides a refernce point or perspectives for defining a
similar but ambiguous situation. In an implicit way, the
rightist Sing Tao Daily said:
On projection, the issue is going to tranform into
a social movement, carrying some colors of mass struggles.
Anyone who care about the safety of Hong Kong will worry
about the course of development because Hone Kong's position
is very delicate. A breeze will blow the grass over.
(Rightist Sing Tao Daily, 5/8/78)
The Hong Kong Times was more explicit. In an editorial
entitled "Don't forget 1967", the writer reminded the readers
of how local Communists ignited a whole series of riots with
a single incident and how they tried to disrup the social
order. In the end the end, the writher warned: :Forgetting the
iilessions we learned in the past is dangerous. It can only
result in woe, damage and blood because those rioters are
still there, only with a different face.(rightist HK Times,19/5/78
4. Appleals to Traditional Behaviour
In its first editorial response to the Jubilee Affair
on May 11, 1978, Kung Sheng Daily characterized the Chinese
intellectual traditions as being gentle, nonaggressive, respect-
inful and compared it with' the anomalies of the now-notorious
Cultural 'Revolution. The editorial writer added:"
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we cannot do without habits and rules. It is because a
group will disintegrate and education will be impossible,
without such rules and habits." The same daily on May 18,
1978 argued for the necessity of closinc the school and
said:".... otherwise, the low will not respect the high,
the mass will then grasp power, anarchy will spread and
reign. By then, the situation will become unmanageable."
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Now I shall present some other findings relevant to
our study of the journalistic paradigm on protest.
1. Referents in headlines and news:
Table 4.6 Referents in Headlines by Press's Party Identification
Press
Referents Rightist Centrist Leftist
Government 16.4 8.633.1
Establishment Church/ 4.1 1.15.6 9.7
School
Pro- 8.7 1.4 0.0
Government
Groups
Pressure 13.6 31.5 37.0
Groups
25.3 41.8 55.5Anti







(No. of News Items) (103) (146) (92)
Each headline mentions or suggests the source of news
which could be the Government, the School authorities and its
supporters on the one side and the protesters and their allies
on the other. The figures in,Table 4.6 clearly shows the
choice of each kind of editors. The rightist editors appear
to be very reluctant to include the rebels or their allies
in the headline. The centrist and leftist editors show
47.4 21.9
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progressively greater generosity in referring to them in
preference to the Government.
A breakdown of the two major opposition parties reveals
that the relative generosity of the centrist and leftist press
with the rebels is given to the pressure groups supporting the
teachers and students. (Table 4.6) The percentages of reference
in headlines from right to left are 13.6, 31.5 and 37.0
respectively. Although the leftist editors shows some signs
of modesty in taking position in headline, they seem to be
less so with reference.




Government 24.7 16.3 9.5
Church/School 2.1 18.43.8 28.5 0.0 9.5Establish ment
Pro-Government 8.6 2.1 0.0
Groups
Pressure Groups 13.3 42.1
Anti- 25.7 57.937.4
Establish- Teachers & 12.4 15.832.0 5.41
ment Students
Establishment
Mixed 45.8 44.2 32.6
nt
(Anti-establishment





Comparing the reference percentages for news in Table 4.7
with those for headlines in Table 4.6, we observe that the
distribution remains almost the same with the centrist and
leftist editors. This suggests that they headline according
to the source of the news. The rightist editors tend to prefer
referring to the Government and its supporters when the news
source is mixed.
2. Context of Headlines and News









Mixed (e.g. protests by the 27.6 P7.424.3
pressure groups and
press release by the
Government)
(No. of news items) (105) (148) (95)
N=348
Table 4.8'shows that all the three categorical press devote
f
almost the same percentage of news items to reports covering
protesting actions,(demonstration, rally, petition, sit in
etc) and non-protesting activities (press confererence,
nterviews and press releases. This bears evidence to the
I assumed equal pool of news information available to all the
press.. But if we look at.the average number of news items
% % %
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]for each paper, the rightist has a low of only 35 while the
other two have 47 each. This should be a logical derivative
from our assumption that the rightist tend to play down the
salience of the event. The leftist paper did not have a
higher average is probably due to the retraint exerted by
the relatively more conservative editors.




Protests 1.9 14.3 4.3
Non-protests 27.1 43.4 22.8
(press conference, press
release, interviews etc.)
e71.0 42.3Mixed (e.g. protest by pressure 73.9
Groups and press release
by Government)'
(No. of headlines) (103) (149) (92)
N= 342
The editors of the centrist papers are more inclined than
the others in headlining the protest activities. (Table 4.9)
This is comprehensible as.both the rightist and the leftist
editors would like the event to diminish in temperature and
radicality, while the centrist editors wanted to sensationalize
the event.to attract wider audience.
3. Form of protest and journalistic objectivity:
The. rightist press seems to be the most affected by the
form,.of the protesters' actions. The extreme rightist Hong Kong
% % %
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Times betrayed its dislike of the radical forms when it put
quotation marks over words like sit-in" and "protest" (HK Times,
17/5/78). In another editorial. on May 12, 1978, it confessed
that the incongruence between the radical form of action a-ad
,the insignificant cause professed by the protesters had led
.it to suspect that there must be some complicated background.
The leftist press seemed to be less bothered by the form
of actions. According to a leftist editor, they were surprised
by the radicality of the actions at the inception. So they
played safe by being neutral in their coverage. However, the
radical form did not prevent them from siding with the protesters
after a few direct observations and interviews with- the rebels.
The cause o'f the event, rather than the form, seemed to have
commanded a greater part of their attention. Wen Wei Pao always
related back to wrongdoings of the establishment that led to
the outbreak of protests and argued for the urgency of righting
these wrongs (Wen Wei Daily, 17/5/78 Ta Kung Daily, 15/5/78),
However, it should not be inferred that the rightists di.d not
stress the importance of causes. They did, But they were
different from the leftist in that the-radical form of social
action seemed to have led them to perceive different causes.
Ironically, their perception was later found to be at odds
with that by the Government's Inquiry Committee.
The centrist papers appeared to be confused by the radical
forms too.. Unlike the rightists and leftists, they. waited for
more information over a longer period prior to any judgement.
In face. of ambiguity, they preferred silence to a quick
definition.' Sing Pao said (18/5/78):" Since the inception
of the event, we have been.suggesting'the Government to release
all the facts on the conflict because we feel the extraordinary
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development of the affair warrants further explanation. A
fair judgment by the citizens requires an understanding of
the reality.
It should be added that the centrist press, while keeping
an open mind for more facts, are inclined to support the
Government. Being forced upon by the rapid. development of
the event to speak up, the Ming Pao editorial writer, after
restating some general principles which favoured neither party,
betrayed his tendency when he continued to ask: If you were
.,to choose between a disciplined but restrained education and
a free.but disorderly education, which would you choose?"17
The writer added that he would pick the latter.
Anyway, the centrist press appeared to be placing heavier
stress,on objectivity. This is further indicated by the centrist
South China Morning Post's shifting its position during the
course of the event.
The Post was an ardent supporter of the Government in
closing the school. Later when it discovered that the
Education Department had deliberately released a piece of
misinformation to discredit the protesters, the editorial
writer felt it, in the interest. of accuracy and fair dealing
it should be corrected and wondered-whether there are other
aspects of the case that have been presented to the public
.as undisputed facts which will have to be qualified or
corrected in the future (SCMP. 19/5/78).
The rightist press seemed to have neglected the counter
evidence that were surfacing. Even when the Government's
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Inquiry Committee openly put the blame on the school
authorities and recinded the warning letters issued to
the teachers, the extreme rightist Hong Kong Times (15/7/78)
kept on exclaiming:" How can such a conclusion satisfy the
majority of the citizens." The other two rightist papers,
Kung Sheung Daily were less slightly consistent in their
positions. They supported the Inquiry Committee's report
on the one hand and murmured that the protesters should bear





In.this chapter I shall first sum up the findings
and relate. to what I have set out to test. More specifically,
a reflection on the theorization of the Journalistic.
paradigm on protest and the possible course of evolution
of the paradigms will be given. Next I shall compare
the case study with a few others to see what further
conclusions can be drawn. The media pluralism as evidenced
by the press's behaviour during the Jubilee School Affair
and other social protests is pulled in to shed light on
the dispute between the plurlalists and Marxists on the
nature of capitalist society's press. Finally, the
role of the press in bridging the elite-mass gap, the
formation of public opinion and the resolution of
social conflicts will be discussed against Hongkong's
political context which is characterized by the absence
of a representative government.
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5.1 The Journalistic Paradigm on Protest: Its Structure
and Evolution
In Chapters 2,3 and 4 I have theorized the existence
and structure of the journalistic paradigm on protest which
is defined as the journalists' or media's pattern of orienta-
tion towards protest in a nation. It is operati (-)na1 ized
into six components: (1) support of suppressive meausres
(2) concern for social order (3) politicization (4)*stereo-
typing by past similar disreputable events (5) externalization
of causes and (6) appeal to traditional codes of behaviour.
The hypothetical positive relationships between the said
attributes of the journalistic paradigm on protest and rightist
party identification have largely been supported by the
research findings.
The rightist journalistic paradigm on protest is charact-
erized.by a political suspicion, if not paranoid, of radical
social protest.. Party politics was what it read in the Jubilee
Affair. It has the tendency to politicize and stereotype.
The traditional codes of behaviour constitute one of its
yardstick for measuring, social behaviour. It seeks to extern-
alize the causes, of unorthodox behaviour by attributing it
to conspiracies or ulteria- motives. Its relatively high
repression potential (propensity to advocate suppressive
measure to put down protests) is evidenced by their strong
support for the Government's high-handed measures and harsh
criticisms of the protesters. Its tolerance of social
instability is low while its concern for social order or the
preservation of the status quo is high. Althought the
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leftist journalistic paradigms on protest nuts social
stability on the first priority yets its relatively high
protest potential (propensity to enF.rap-e in protest) and
low repression potential are borne out by its implicit and
explicit support of the protesters and. condemnation of the
Government's suppressive policies. On the whole, the leftist,
journalistic paradigm on protest is an opposite of the
rightist paradigm. It tends to account for the occurrence
by structural reasons built in the system or institution
concerned. In the case of non-political protest, it is less
inclined than the rightist to politicize and stereotype.
1The6entrit. journalistic paradigm on protest, on the other
hand, appear to be more diversified in their outlook. In
general, it is less preoccupied and more detached. Social
stability and social order, are great concerns to the centrist
press which, however allows more room than the rightist for
radical protests. Professional ethics like objectivity
appear to have an important impact on the press's position.
The journalistic paradigm on protest are conceived. to be
basically a function of a given political ideology which
is relatively stable over time. It follows- that these
paradigms, especially those of the newspapers which as
institutions are enjoying a lower degree of freedom than
journalists as individuals, remain stable over time as well.
According to Kuhn (1970), switch in scientific paradigms
will happen when the old paradigm fails to reconcile with
newly discovered facts. By analogous reasoning, I suppose
that individual journalists may adjust their paradigms when
the facts do not agree with their paradigmi.c projections.
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The rightists and some centrists projected the Jubilee
Affair to be political in nature but the Government
confirmed that the accusation was groundless. They guessed
that the protesters must have some ulteria motives which
were finally dismissed by the Government's Inquiry Committee.
In essence, the Jubilee Affair turned out to be a radically
new social phenomenon beyond the scope of the journalists'
experience. The more reflective journalists might have
learned a lesson. They should have left enough room to
accommodate the emergence of a "new" kind of protest--
radical in form, but non-political in nature-- as the Jubilee
Case was. The media workers that I have interviewed all
seemed to remember the event vividly and were able to draw
implications from the event. A few reporters are known
to have disputed with their editors.on the way the event
should be covered. The reporters wanted to present the
protesters more favourably than their seniors did. All the
interviewees agreed that'a sustained and intensive exchange
of views on handling the coverage had taken place in the
midst of the event. So, in a sense, the event had created
a debating session in which different paradigms on protests
clashed. Conflict of views could have led to change,
however slight, for the majority of the journalists.
To-be sure, the Government is learning from events. The
riots in 1966 and 1967 had led to the decentralization of the
Government and the-establishment of recreational program for
the young. The Jubilee Affair has led to the institutiona1-
ization of communication channels between the teachers and
school authorities. The press and journalists should have
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a lesson to learn from the Jubilee Affair too: Be more
aware of the existence of their journalistic paradigms.
in general and journalistic paradigms on protest in
particular.. It is expected that heightened awareness
will encourage the journalists to grow in empathy by which
I mean an increase in ability to shift'in paradigms while
perceiving an ambiguous social protest. In so doing, they
would be more open-minded. for the emergence of new social
phenomenon and less inclined to define the situation by
,the old in the absence of adequate information.
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5.2 Media Pluralism and the Nature of the Press
As with all case study, this study can be accused of having
selected an atypical case and there is always the possibility of
choosing another case that does not seem to fit. So I have to
specify once again the conditions of the case and see how it
relates to other cases.
The Jubilee case was militant in form, controversial and
non-political in nature. It happened in a colonial city-state
which has no party of its own but a residual party-system of
China's recent past, which-somehow congrues with Hong Kong's
press structure. Social protests are becoming an integral
part of the city's political culture characterized by the people'
growing concern about local public affairs.
In a case study of an anti-war demonstration on October
27, 1968 in Britain, Halloran et al.(1970) found that British
national press were all-adopting a negative definition of the
demonstration originated by the legitimated power holders.
Murdock (1976: p. 158), a co-researcher of the study, in a
separate paper attributed this media monism indirectly to the
media's vested interest in the existing political and economic
system. The demonstration they studied was political in nature
and .militant in form. In some sense, the Jubilee Affair is a
supplementary case for it is of another type- militant in
form but non-political in nature. The media scene in Hong
Kong was not as monistic as Halloran.et al. portrayed it to
be. Far from. consensus, the press were split not only between
the leftist press and the non-leftist press but most remarkably
among the, centrist press. The centrists were cautious in their
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position. The rightists never hesitated to argue for
the Government's definition of the situation. The leftists
were careful in their support of the protesters. The common
denominator among them all was the concern for the preservation
of general social stability, though each showing varying
degrees of committment. Media pluralism in which views
over a whole social andpo.lit's_cal spectrum seemed to have
bloomed in full. In the end, the centrist South China Morning
Post even discarded its former adoption of ,the official
definition of the case in view of evidence contrary to
what the Government had revealed.
Further insights can be drawn by comparing the Jubilee
Case with other kinds of protests that have happened in
Hong Kong.
On the one end is the 1967 protests and riots which
were militant inform and political in nature. They were
spill-over from the Chineses Cultural Revolution and were
led by the local Communists. Anybody could see that the
turmoil was putting the status quo at.stake. This impending
danger sharply polarizes the press, the pro-Government
centrists. and the rightists on one side, the leftists on
the other (Lee, 1981). The leftist newspapers. were turned
into propaganda machine modelling after Lenin's and Mao's
conceptualization of apress. The press's function to
inform was minimized and instead supplanted by agitating,
educating, organizing and combating. Continuous deterioration
of the political situation forced the Government to invoke
the laws and to.translate zealously the letter and spirit
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of the ordinances and regulations into action. It closed
three mini-leftist papers, arrested leftist.reporters and
issued warning letters to representative papers like Wen
Wei Daily, Ta Kung Daily and Ching Daily (Lee, 1981: p.218-
220). The then revolutionary Chinese Government reacted
strongly to these closures and arrests by filing diplomatic
ultimata to Britain and staging demonstrations in Peking
and Canton. According to Mr. Chak-lam Ng, Deputy Secretary
of Home Affairs, the Hong Kong Government did not go on to
close big leftist papers like Wen Wei and Tai Kung for fear
that it would draw impulsive reactions that might be detrimental
to the survial of the existing system from the Peking
revolutionaries. It can be seen that the formidable political
force backing the rebellious press had rendered media pluralism
pretty much intact even in times of social turmoil. This-
phenomenon is specific to Hong Kong which has an intricate
political system. In retrospect, the riots had located the
outermost boundary of A frAA nrP4q cvctAm_
On the other end is the anti-bus-fare-increase campaign,
led by some 300. social groups (including the radical pressure
groups-and many religious groups), which happened in the early
part of 1981. Obviously it was non-political in nature and
relatively mild in form. The. issue, -was not explosive to such
an extent that the campaign might disrupt the social stability
of Hong. Kong. The press unanimously supported the portesters,
though with varying degrees of committment. Impressionistic
as well as systematic observation have shown that the rightists
':were more reserved while the leftist and-some centrists were
more outspoken. These comparisons confirm that Hong Kong has
a form of media pluralism which I think, sheds new light on
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the competing views on the nature of press in a capitalist
society.
On the very nature of the mass media's role in a capitalist
society there are two competing paradigms, disregarding the
less prominent ones. One is the libertarian or pluralistic
point of view as explicated by .Siebert (Siebert et al..1976)
and many other American communication scholars. The rivalling
view comes from the Marxists/ Marx-influenced sociologists
like Murdock and Golding (1979) who regard the mass media
basically tools of class dominance.
The pluralistic view is characterised by the media's
claim to be the Fourth Estate of a democratic society, playing
the role of a watchdog on behalf of the people. That the
press has been doing some muckraking of frauds committed by
the top of the ruling class has reinforced this popular
watchdog image of the press. Professional ethics like
objectivity, impartiality, balanced reporting and the like
are supposed-to be internalized codes in guaranteeing the
quality of social service the media render. The media's
news treatment and opinions expressed, when they do, are
seemed'to be detached from selfish interest and solely in
the interest-of communal good. Opinions are supposed to
be diversified, representative and free. Ownership is
separated from control which rests in the hands-of the pro--
fessional journalists. Journalists upholding the'prof essional
virtues claim themselves to be enjoying autonomy in the daily
operation of the media. The media world is such a nice market
place.of idea and information that people can do. their own'
shopping...
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The opposing view is rooted in Marx's writing which was
originally a delineation of the,general relationship between
the-economic foundations and the superstructure:
In the social production of their existence,
men inevitably enter into definite relations,
which are independent of their will, namely
relations of production.... The totality of
these relations of production constitutes the
economic structure of society, the real founda-
tion, on which arises a legal and plitical super-
structure and to which correspond definite forms
of social consciousness. The mode of production
of material life conditions the general process
of social, 42political and intellectual life. (Marx,
1975, p. 425)
Much of Marx's intellectual endeavour had been with the
study, of economics. He had not fully elaborated 'his ideas
on the production of culture in a capitalist society. So
Marx's ideas were subjected to various interpretations.
The main current of Soviet sociology holds a crudely
deterministic. view of base-superstructure relations in.
which cultural forms were reduced to more or less simple
reflections of economic and class relations. However,
according to neo-Marxists like Murdock and Golding, a
careful reading of Marx's works. reveals that the notion of
determination and conditioing was not used in this narrow
I sense. but in much looser sense of setting limits, exerting
pressures and closing off options (Murdock,(et al. 1979:
p.16). In, opposition to the 'Soviet dogma are the Frankfurt
Marxists who stress both the complexity and relative autonomy
of cultural forms, and insist on the centrality and importance
of cultural criticism (FIRR, Chapter 7).
The common theme among these many versions of inter-
pretations is that the media in a capitalist society are
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cultural organizations perpetuating the inequlaities
embedded in the social structure and they belong to what
Althusser called the ideological state apparatuses
(Althusser, 1971: PP-136-137).
The Marxist view has a point to make with respect to
the case of Hong Kong too. The majority of Hong Kong's
papers are enmeshed in the present economic and political
system both directly through interlocking directorships
and reciprocal share-holdings, and indirectly through
their dependence upon advertising. They therefore have
vested interest in the stability and continuing existence
of the present system. The party-linked press are simply
decreed by party policies to upkeep Hong Kong as it is.
This unanimous committment to the preservation of the status
quo by Hong Kong 's press accounts much for its role as the
state's ideological apparatuses.
However, this unanomity should not be emphasized to
such an extent that variance in degrees of committment is
neglected. Hong Kong's media pluralism which I have described
earlier appears to be a classical case of the libertarian
view. At least in form, a whole political spectrum of pers-
pectives and versions of news, are available on the market
whereas consumers are free to do their own shopping. Since
media pluralism reigned even in social turmoils in which
some papers constituted part of the rebellious force (as in
the case of the 1967 riots), we can conclude that in the last
analysis, Hong Kong's press system lends greater support to
the libertarian view rather than the Marxist view.
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5.3 The Press, Public Opinion and Conflict Resolution
Kin g(1975)attributed the stability of Hong Kong in the last
hundred years primarily to the Government's successful process
of the administrative absorption politics which means the process
through which the British governing elites coo pt or assimilate
the non-British socio-economic elites into political admini-
strative decision-making bodies, thus attaining an elite
integration on the one hand-and a legitimation of political
authority on the other (King, 1975, p. 437). He argues that
elite consensus no longer constitutes a-sufficient condition
for legitimacy of Government in a society that has been baptised
by rapid urbanization, or more specifically, social mobilization,
whereby the apolitical strata transform into politically
relevant strata. It follows that elite-mass consensus,
rather than elite consensus, has become necessary for social
stability. In 1973, he envisioned that the basic problem 'of
legitimacy in Hong Kong lay not in elite dissensus but in
the elite-mass gap (King, 1975: p. 438). The Jubilee Affair
was a test case of King's analysis. As we shall see, the
press as a system is functional in'bridging this elite-mass
gap.
Right after the closure of the school, the Government
seemed to have no problem in alligning the elites behind it
when the Legislative Council and the Executive Council
unanimously passed the resolution to support the closure
policy, which was then echoed by-the elite groups and some
prestiged papers such as Wah Kiu, Sing Tao, Kung Sheung
1 and South China Morning Post. However -he protesters
persisted'in the fights and growing support from the media
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and the public. A prolonged. publicity of pressure group
activities would probably result in lowering the Government's
general credibility which it wants to avoid (SCOPG Report,
p.23). Moreover, the event had the possibility of rocking
the social stability of Hong Kong if left unsolved. At
least it might tarnish the peaceful and stable image of
Hong Kong which is essential for attracting foreign invest-
ment. Thus the whole information machine at the disposal of the
Government was turned on to discredit the rebels and to
rally support from the people. Under its direct control
was the Government Information Services which had a tele-
printer installed in almost all the newspapers. it is
through this direct line that the newest information and
the offical versions of the event were transmitted to the
newspapers many of which are reportedly to be their habitual
consumers. 18
In addition of the Information Services, the Government
has a.press system that is basically susceptible to its
influence. It has been developing a battery of media tactics
to mobilize public opinion to its advantage. It knows when
to leak information as a trial balloon. It knows which press
will be the most receptive and who should be invited to the
briefing sessions. During the course of the Jubilee Affair,
exclusive briefings had been given to the centrist Ming Pao,
a paper catering to the intellectuals and the better-educated.
At least two other briefings were said to have,been given to
a few newspapers, 19 The pressure group leaders and protesters
unanimously said that newspaers, especially those close to
the Government, were functional in relating the Government's
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intentions. They read between the lines to guess the
Government's moves.
The press system, on the other hand, 'was ready
to cover the ever critical, if, not opposing, pressure groups
or protesters. Both the centrist and leftist press generously
allocated space for the words and deeds of the.protesting
pressure goups. It would be a hard time for them if the
media neglected their voice or activities. Trying to woo
the media to their cause had been a conscious effort of the
protesters in the Jubilee Affair. They timed to give away
1 information to make the most relevant impact. They designed
actions to attract the greatest. -attention. Leading participants
in the Affair said.that they set aside 10 to 15 minutes to
exchange intelligence on the development of the event which
usually amounted to nothing but what was reported in the media.
At one time, the media were so silent that they had to think
up an action to remind the public that the issue remained to
be settled. 20 The media-conscious protesters delayed their
petition.march to,the Governors House until the TV-crews
arrived. The press system is not only essential for the
reflection of the protesters' views. It seems to be playing
an important role in the formation of public opinion. During
the heat of the Jubilee Affair, it was found that 90% of the
population had heard of the event.21 The source of information
was categorized as. follows: TV: 12.3%. Press: 21.2% TV' Press:
55.1% Radio: 6.3% Friends: 3.6% Others: 1.5% A total of 76.3%
of the people who had learnt of the event used the press as
one of their 'chief sources of' information. If the press system were-
not as' pluralistic as it is now, the public might have suffered
from poverty, not to say inaccuracy of a single version of
the event.
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The consumption pattern of the press was rather lopsided
in preference for the centrist and some rightist press. The
ratio of people referring to each of these press- the rightist
Sing Tao, the centrist Sing Pao and the leftist Wen Wei- as
their source of information during the Jubilee Affair was:
35.-.49 :2.21 The ratio should not be generalized to represent
the circulation distribution among the three catergories of
the press because the individual papers were not equal in
their representativeness. However, the basic press consumption
.,pattern of the people was clear. They preferred reading the
centrist and center-right papers to leftist and extreme rightist
ones. It means that the marketplace,is diversified with ideas
but some are more marketable than others. The market is so
structured that the extremely party-linked press cannot reach
the mass, even if they have some elements of truth to offer
on some occasions. It is difficult for us to assess the impact
of the press's coverage of the event on the attitude of the
people. However, the media's orientation towards the Jubilee
Affair coincides with that of the people who were found to be
as split as the media. When asked whether they supported the
protesters' actions, 43% answered yes, 34% said no. and the rest
said they had no opinion.21Being the people's chief source of
information about local public affairs, the press's portrayal
of the event must have some effect on the formation of public
opinion.
According to Ng Chak-lam, Deputy Secretary. of Home Affairs,
the press, and public opinion did have an effect, on the Government's
reversing its policy in the Jubilee Affair. He said that
the..Government basically: regards the press system exemplified
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by editorials as something of a" think-tank" 22which provides
the Government with different ideas and proposals. Sli mmi nom, the 1 at
Director of Information Services, emphasized that editorials
and letters to the editors are very useful pointers to the
mood and intensity of public opinion (Slimming, l979,p.25).
The Government Information Service is responsible for summari-
zing the press's opinions in a daily OPINION to be circulated
among the Government officals. News from the Hong Kong Chinese
Press is also summarized in a daily output called GIST
(Government Information Service Tabloid) which may catch the
attention of the top-ranking decision-makers in the Government.
Besides mass media, the Government had other channels for
tapping public opinion which however do not concern us here.
At the inception of the Jubilee Affair, there was no
question of a general consensus among the elites. Nevertheless,
the mass and the press were split in opinion. It was only
when the Government changed itssuppressive policy that the
social dissensus was replaced by a general consensus. It is
believed that this process from dissensus to consensus not
only enhansed the legitimation of the Government but also
imparted.a stronger sense of social participation to the
press and the citizens at large.23 We can therefore conclude
that the media are indispensable in relaying the grievance
and intensity of the mass's feelings to the governing elites
in normal times and conflicting period., They are also
functional in facilitating downward communication between
the Government and the people. It is fortunate that given
a city-state like Hong Kong which has no representative
government of its own has a pluralistic press system which
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has proved, at least in the case of the Jubilee Affair, to
be responsive enough to the calls of the protesters, thus
bridging the elite-mass gap and facilitating the resolution
of the social conflict. Without such a responsive pluralistic
press system in a no-party state, the elite-mass gap may
enlarge to such. an extent that communication between the rulers
and the ruled breaks down and that the underprivileged may
have to resort to more radical actions in making their voice
heard.
One last remark: It cannot be denied that the press
was effective in reflecting the views of the pressure groups
and protesters. But given the present social and political
structure, the pressure groups and the undeprivileged can
only have their voice promptly heard and taken care of by
investing hundreds of man-hours into their campaigns or
portest activities. This is a costly social investment, if
not wastage, in labour, time and money. To minimize this
wastage and-to make the society a better place to live in,
the communication between the. Government and the people must
be sufficiently and wisely institutionalized. Meanwhile, the
media have muchl,to improve themselves in helping to bridge
the elite-mass gap. on a more conscious level.
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FOOTNOTES
1. According to the data compiled by Dr C.K.and Dr. A. King
of the Chinese University of Hong Kong, about 560 social
protests and conflicts, staged by various groups, were
recorded by the press to happened from 1969 to 1978. The
percentage (240%) is approximated and is calculated by
myself.
2. I have found that political ideolof y is highly related to
the journalists' stand on the Jubilee School Affairs in
a survey (Appendix4, Section 4).
3. The seven organizations are: The Reform Club of Hong
Kong, The Hong Kong Civic Association, the United Nations
Association of Hong Kong, the Democratic Self-Government
Party, the Hong Kong Socialist Democratic Party, the
Labour Party of Hong Kong and the Liberal Democratic Party.
4. Dr. Yu-shek Cheng, Centre Daily, April 27, 1980. p.1.
5. New Evening News, October 5, 1980. p. 4.
6. The archipelago is .a cluster of rock girt islands and
lonely reefs lying some-120 miles northeast of Taiwan
and 570 miles southwest of Japan. They had been occupied
and administered by the United States as part of Okinawa.
For centuries the islets served primarily as a refuge for
Chinese fishermen, until recently Chinese fishermen had
still used them. However, with the discovery of oil
deposits-aroundithe islets reported by the Economic
Commission of Asia and the Far East in 1968-69, China,
Taiwan, and Japan immediately became entangled in a
jurisdictional dispute..
7. John Cooper has given quite a detailed description of..
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the riots in his book: Colony in Conflict, 1967,
Swindon Book Company, Hong Kong.
8. The Seventies Magazine, June, 1981. There was a
special, feature on the fate of the democratic movement
in China.
9. The Control of Publication Ordinance, section,3.
10. Wah Kiu Yat Pao, March 15, 1977. P.3.
11. The percentage is calculated on the basis of the.survey
as described in Appendix 4, Section 1.
12. The self-selection by party identification is evidenced
by the survey as described in Appendix 4, Section 5.
13. The definitions of these operands have been given in
Section 2.2.
14. A more detailed. explanation of the survey is given in
Appendix 4.
15. Please see Footnote 14.
16. Ming Pao, May 21, 1978. Ediotrial.
17. Ming Pao, May 18, 1978, Editorial.
18. The most important reason is that many papers do not
have enough manpower. They need the Government's
information to fill up the space.
19. Undergrad, June 19, 1978. p.30.
20. The hunger-strike July 7, 1978 was planned under this
consideration.
21. The figures were released by the,Social Science Society
of Hong Kong University. It was a random sampling of
the whole population. The major figures are available
from Sing Pao, May 28, 1978.
22. Mr. Ng said sometimes they check their policies against
the alternatives proposed by the.ediotrial writers.
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23. Several scholars representing the social conflict
school of thought have referred to the role of conflict
in arousing and maintaining citizen participation.
(Coser, 1956 Dahrendorf, 1959).
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APPENDIX I
DESCRIPTION OF THE JUBILEE SCHOOL-AFFAIR *
Information sources include newspaper clippings,
interviews with protesters and documents
provided me by the teachers of the Jubilee School.
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DESCRIPTION OF THE JUBILEE SCHOOL AFFAIR
The Jubilee Secondary School was founded in 1973 by the
Catholic Precious Blood Order under the principalship of Sister
Leung Kit-fun, who was very liberal, if not radical, in her
educational philosophy. She had successfully recruited a staff
of competent and enthusiastic teachers to run the school, which
in some. four years had become very outstanding among the
generally conservative schools. The teachers helped set up
a student union, which was not commonly found in high schools
in Hong Kong. Students. were, encouraged to discipline themselves.
People from many walks of life were invited to speak at
weekly meetings to enlarge their scope of vision. The teachers
were very. serious about their teaching. They were ready to
accept criticism- from their students. Most of the staff were
in their twenties and were once heads of student unions in
the universities,. so the relationship betweenIthe teachers
and the students was described as being very "friendly".
Many visitors and teaching interns were impressed with the
self-discipline, and initiativeness of the students and by. the
ardour. and determination of the teachers. Lecturers in-the
Chinese University's College of Education hailed the school,
as..a 'model for others to emulate.
All went well until 1977 when the teachers through a
series of incidents, discovered that the school authorities
were systematically exploiting the students and staff through
the following.channels:
1. Defrauding staff members of.their salaries
2. Profiteering
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3. Extra-charges collected from students
4. Defrauding the capitation grant allotted by the
Government
A large sum of money had been siphoned to the account of
the Precious Blood Order. The teachers finally decided to
bring the matter to Hong Kong Government's Independment
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) after they failed to
get a satisfactory reply from the school and church-authorities.
On June 2, 1977, four months after the complaint was filed,
the teachers were informed by the ICAC in writing that no
evidence of corruption has been found and advised that no
further action should be taken on their complaint. The teachers
sent a memorandumof the financial irregularities to the
Education Department to help with the investigation. Meanwhile,
it was announced the Sister Leung had resigned from the school
and that an education officer from Education Department joined
the school management committee. The money collected by
Sister Leung had all been saved under the account of the
Precious Blood*Order, the mother superior of which, Sister Wu,
now then filed a complaint to the Education Department of
the financial irregularities. It appeared then Sister Leung
was staged to be the scapegoat of the scandal. The teachers
sent a detailed report pinpointing,where the irregularities
were to the Education Department, which finally completed
the investigation and turned the case over to the Commercial
Crime Bureau.
Rumours began to get around the parishes that Sister
Leung was toppled by leftist teachers. On May 1, a
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letter from a reader signed a student's parent was published
in the Popular Daily. The letter pointed out that a certain
Sister Leung, former principal of a girls school in Homantin,
had resigned for political reasons. The parent went on to
say that the school had already been infiltrated by left-
wing teachers.
At about the same time, many students received a letter
signed a teacher which clarified what had recently happened
in the school and, exposed in details the financial irregulari-
ties practised by the school during the past four years. The
Student Union responed by asking, in writing, the school
authorities and the Education Department to clarify the
matter, but. to no avail.
In Hong Kong, teachers' contract have to be renewed every
yeah, even for teachers who have been tenured. On June 3,
the school issued contracts to the teachers. A new clause,
in addition to others, was most ominously introduced that
read:" The School management reserves the right to dismiss,
after appropriate notice, any teaching staff who fails to
observe any one of the above regulations. In the past,
however,the school, to dismiss a teaching staff, had to
abide by the Code of Aid issued by the.Education Department,
which requires a school to give reasonable verbal as well as
written warnings to the teachers concerned on'dismissal or
termination of the contract.
Frustrated by the reluctance of the school to clarify
the financial allegation and obsessed by the fear of the
teachers' refusal to sign the. unreasonable contracts, the
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students made a further attempt. On June 9, the students
gathered in the playground, requesting a clarification from
the school authorities their requests were rejected and they
were ordered to go back to the classrooms. It was then that
the students began to sit down waiting for a reply. The
teachers joined the sit-in after some time.
The sit-in resumed the next day after the morning
assembly, but there was not any reply from the school authori-
ties. On the same day the teachers signed the new contract.
On June, 17, when normal classes had already resumed in
the school for a week, warning letters were issued to all 35
teachers by the Director of Education, Mr. Topley, on the
ground that the Director believed that the sit-in would resume
the following week. In the letter, the Director of Education
warned all 35 teachers, including 2 nuns, that they were
'directly or indirectly involved with pupil in defiance of
the school authorityand that any repetition of such behaviour
might result in cancellation of their teachers' registration.
On June 20, more than 800 students ofthe school out of a total
of 900 jointly wrote a letter to the Director of Education,
asking him to withdraw the warning letters.to their teachers
and saying that his charges were trumped-up. The Student
Union was then dissolved by the school authorities on the
ground that.it had not been registered with the Education
Department. Mr. Haye, the Deputy Director of Education, on
July 9, 1977 gave a well-publicized speech, in which he
declared that,the "smear campaigns" launched to maliciously
discount the Catholic Church's contribution to Honor Knn'a
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education would be fruitless. With the departure of all the
nuns of the Precious Blood Order, who had been staying in the
school for four years, was the arrival of Miss Hilda Kwan.
She was appointed principal by the Most Rev. Bishop John
Baptist Wu on August 1, 1977. The aftermaths of the
financial scandal continued to emerge and develop. There were
many small conflicts between the new school authorities and
the teacher-student body that the teachers commented that
the. whole school was suffering from an. at mosphere of
suspicion and hostitlity. Here are some examples: Starting
from October 1977, the school bags of the students had been
secretly searched many times a laboratory assistant newly
employed by the principal always took pictures of students
inside the school premises despite the objection of the students;
conversations were taped black lists of students were compiled;
the police were called at the disposal of the principal
regardless of the feelings of the students parents and
students asked to see the principal to revive the Students'
Union, to open Form 6 classes for the Form 5 graduates, to
explain the secret search of.the school bags, etc. Besides,
the old girls were not allowed to visit the schools or
attend activities organized for the whole school. On one
occasion, it was only after waiting. for an hour for the
permissicon to attend the school concert that the old girls
were told that the principal rejected their request. More-
over, the alumni association was not allowed to be established.
To sume up, "the situation in school had deteriorated to such
an extent that it was clear Miss Kwan had lost the respect of
most of the students."
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On February 14, Sister Leung Kit-fun, the former
principal, was charged with obtaining property by deception
The charges were amended on February 21 to ten charges of
false accounting. Sister Leung admitted fraud and on
February 23 was given a six-month suspended sentence.
After the conviction of Sister Leung, the students from
Form 2 to 5 sent letters to the Education Department, the
Commercial Crimes Bureau, the Catholic Bishop and the Precious
Blood Order urging for full disclosure of the financial
irregularities. Educational bodies such as the Hong Kong
Professional Teachers' Union, the Education Action Group the
post-secondary college student bodies such as the,Hong Kong
Federation of Catholic Students, the Hong Kong Federation of
Studetns the Hong Kong Observers and the Catholic Juctice
and Peace Commission repeatedly asked Mr. Topley, the
Director of Education to rescind the 35 warning letters
and to give a full disclosure of the findings of the investi-
gation as the sum of money involved in the conviction was
only $27,930, about 10% of the total that the teachers estimated
to have been embezzled.
It was two months after Sister Leung Kit-fun was convicted
in court that the Education Department announced on April 4,
1978 the the Precious Blood Order had put $320,000 back into
the school account on March 2, 1978.
April 3, five warning. letters signed by the school
Supervisor, Sister Lorraine were sent to five teachers of
the school, and two more were sent to the teachers on April 12,
complaining of their misbehaviour since the beginning of the
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academic year. The teachers took the letters to be signals
of impending dismissal.
Secret schoolbag searching were alleged to have happened
again. The students requested an investigation by the school
authorities which broke their promises several times to reveal
the result of the investigation. The students had to hand
around the offices for chances to meet the principal, who as
a rule, refused to talk to them.
Out of the expectation of the students, instead of being
told the result of the investigation, four students were
suspended from school for two weeks and another three given
warning.letters. They were severely cautioned for "encircling
the principal and "infringing the personal freedom" of the
principal and the deputy principal, Miss Lo.
According to the teachers, "the whole school was shocked
and distressed". Most of the students began to have growing
concern for the schoolmates being victimized., The teachers
tried to talk to the'school authorities to lift the suspension
of the students but to no avail.
The parents of the students then sought help from.teachers.
It was then that the studetns, teachers and parents began to
sit together to deal with the problems existing in school.
They then brought the case to Mr. Szeto, the president of the
Professional Teachers' Union who after hearing the complaint,
promised to help. Mr. Szeto contacted all the relevant
agencies and persons, asking for mediation. To his disappoint-
ment, no one could help to change the decision of the principal.
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An incident happend on.May 3. It precipitated the conflict.
With the approval of the principal, allthe.Form two students
prepared to come back to school to have an unified English
Test. However, when they were about to enter the school they
were stopped by the non-teaching staff at the gate to check
the names and classes ofthe students and why they returned.
As the some 200 students were anxious to be on time for the
test, they tried to get into the school while the non-teaching
staff Joined their hands to form a human barrier. It was then
that some of the students were scratched, pushed down and
kicked on the spot.
When .a number of teachers and students asked ..to see the
principal to discuss staff's assault on May 5, the principal
refused to see them, and to the shock of everybody, called
the police claiming that she was intimidated.
On May 7, parents decided to make what happened known to
the public. At a press conference, with the help of Mr. Szeto,
the details of the principal's high-handed measures and the
conflicts in school were revealed.
In counteraction, Miss Kwan held another press conference
the very next day, May 8,.denying all the charges against her.,
and smearing the students before the public. At the same time,
the Education Department gave full support to her Judgement,
integrity and decision made.
Having tried all legitimate channels to improve the
school's situation and finding.that they all led to a blank
wall, the 16 teachers agreed to support the parents', proposal
to petition the Governor. And the teachers themselves intended
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to petition the Bishop in the hope of improving the condition
of the school. According to the teachers, they still believed
that Bishop Wu, the head of the Catholic Diocess of Hong Kong,
could exercise influence on the school as it was directly run
by the Church.
On May 9, about 440 students, 20 parents and 16 teachers
took part in the petition after school. Three separate petition
from the students, teachers and parents were handed to the aid-
de-camp of Governor's House. In their petition, the teachers
and students described the abnormal condition in the school
since their exposure of the financial irregularities and ended
up by demanding the dismissal of the principal.
Another petition from the teachers was handed to the
Bishop's secretary, Fr. Mencarini Lido, at Caritas House where
the Bishop lives. What they got from the,Bishop was silence.
Still expecting to have a meeting with Bishop, the teachers.
and parents stayed for the first night outside the Cathedral.
And the Bishop's unexpected refusal to meet the parents. and
teachers led to the sit-in in the following days.
On the next day, repeated phone calls were made to contact
the Bishop.but all in vain. Several hundred students came back
to the Cathedral to join the teachers and parents. Those who
stayed_in school also staged a sit-in. No answer from the
Bishop anyway. Teahcers and parents continued to sleep outside
the Cathedral for the second night.
On May 11, the Bishop finally send four representatives
to listen to petitioners who made the following demands:
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1. to allow the suspended students to resume classes
immediately
2. to rescind warning letters issued to both students
and teachers by the school principal;
3. to dismiss the principal.
The same night the Bishop 7Ppiied that the first demand was
beyond his power. On May 12, the Educators' Social Action
Council and the Professional Teachers' Union issued a joint
statement calling on the teahers and students to remain calm
and not to make the situation worse. In response to their call,
the teachers and students went back to.school on the morning
of May 12, The sit-in was called off.
All except the suspended were allowed to enter the school.
As the suspension was supposed to end on Sunday, the teachers
told the students that classes would be resumed on Monday.
The students agreed.
When teachers and students were prepared to go back to
school on Monday, the closure order of school was abruptly
issued at 4:00 p.m. on Sunday, May 14,
According to Mr. Haye, the acting Director of Education,
a close study of recent development at the school, together
with 'hourly report's from the school, and first-hand obseivation
by Senior Inspectors, had convinced him that the massive
disruption of studies at Preciou Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary
School would continue. He claimed that the decision to close
the school was not only "inevitable" but also "necessary."
His argument-was based on concrete information to suggest-
that there would have been more trouble. However, on the other
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hand, there is no evidence whatsoever that the teachers
and students in defiance of school authority mean to abandon
their campaign of intimidation".
He also announced that the school would be under a new
name,St. Teresa's,in the coming September with the same board
of management and principal, except that the sixteen teachers'
contracts would not be renewed.
The decision was not merely a shock to the teachers,
students and parents, but ,a shock to the education circle
and the citizens of Hong Kong.
But the closure could not make the teachers and students
silent, it.only made them together with the parents. They
decide to make another petition to the Governor and stage
another sit-in outside the Bishop's office.
On May 15, they petitioned the Governor to voice their
grievance, and then they.attended a rally and held a press
conference at the University of Hong Kong. Later, they also
handed the letters of petition to the representative of Bishop
Wu and staged .a sit in outside th.e. Catholic Bishop' Office,
hoping that the problem could be solved. What they demanded
was the immediate re-opening.of the school, but the Bishop..
did'not pay attention to them.
On May 16, the members of the Executive Council unani-
mously endorsed the. decision of the Education Department to
closed down the school. At the same time, a three-member
committee of.inquiry, headed by Dr. Rayson Huang, the vice-
chancellor of the University of Hong Kong, was established to
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"recommend measures aimed at preventing a recurrence of the
problems besetting the Precious Blood Golden Jubilee Secondary
School". In other words, it has no power to recommend any
solution to the problems, nor is it intended to publicize
the cause of the dispute and reveal the whole truth.
On May 17, Bishop Wu in a public statement announced that
he was in full support of the decision of the Education Department.
In the morning on May 18, the teachers, students and
parents handed their letters of protest to their represntative
of the Bishop, showing their anger at the Bishop's announcement.
Their petition had already changed into protests. On May 19,
they launched a protest against the closure by the Education
Department. They travelled on foot from the Bishop's office
to the main office of the Education Department at Causeway Bay
and handed their letters of protest to its representative,
severaly charging its move.
On May 18, there were some post-secondary students helping
the students revise their lessons. In order to let the students
continue their studies, the teachers and parents asked the post-
secondary students if they could arrange places for such purposes.
Later, they reached the conclusion that from May 22 onwards, the
girls with the help of the post-secondary students, would continue
their studies at the premises of the.Student' Union in the two
universities of Hong Kong
On the other hand, the Education Department announced on
May 20, that it would arrange classes for Form two to Form four
students. The action was to deverge the pressure of, the public
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opinion and to disintegrate the unity of the students who are
pursuing their studies at the universities, according to the
teachers' analysis.
Although the students are having their tutorials at both
universities, they have never abandoned the chance to fight for
re-opening the school. The teachers and parents had been trying
hard to contact different societies, bodies and people of different
walks of, life, explaining to them the twist and turns. of the
happening and hoping with their help the problems could be
solved by feasible ways.
Petition letters had been handed tothe!Governor and Bishop
by various societies and committees, requesting re-opening of the
school.
On May 28 (Sunday), about 10,000 people, many of whom
were representatives of various,organizations, attended the
mass rally in Victoria Park to protest, against the closure of
the school. The participants unanimously called for the
immediate re-opening of the school. In the rally, the 19 speakers
attacked the high-handed policy of the Education Department
and the. haughty attitude of the Bishop. At the end of the rally,
Mr. Szeto, the president of the Professional Teachers' Union,
read out the manifesto of the organizers and announced that
a dollar a head fund raising drive and a signature campaign
would get underway. The money collected would pay for rallies,
publicity, legal fees and other activities.
On the same day, ICAC confirmed that it was the teachers
who first exposed the financial irregularities of'the school,
contrary to the Education Department's repetitive assertion
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that it was the-School Management who took the initiative.
According to the teachers, the extra-ordinary stress on the
correct chronology issued by the Education Department was
a deliberate move to mislead the public to the following
implications:
1. The teachers used the financial problems as an excuse
to cause trouble, when the school authorities asked them to sign
more restrictive contracts.
2. No revenge action and the subsequent persecution on
the teachers could be implied as it was the board of Management
that exposed the irregularities, and Miss Hilda Kwan's measures,
therefore, had nothing to do with revenge.
The mass rally on May 28 was followed by numerous petitions
by the victims and their supporters, countermoves by the
Education Department and three meetings between the teachers and
the three-member committee of enquiry.
On June 26, two representatives of the teachers and parents
were sent. off to England to seek the help of the Parliament members
and the Office of Home Affairs. The sympathetic educational bodies
parents,teachers and students were at the airport to see them off.
The scene. was relatively quiet until July when two teachers
and a ..group of-.sympathetic-supporters went on hunger strike at
the Bishop's residence, demanding the rapid re-opening of the
school. The hunger strike was dismissed by a mass demonstration
organized by the United Front for the re-opening of the school.
Several thousand People joined the march.' Petitions were handed
over to.the Governor's and theBishop's offices.
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The whole Jubilee School Affair virtually came to an end
when, on July 15, the official Enquiry Committee published its
report which certified that it was the school authorities'
corruption that broke the harmony within the school. As a remedy,
the Committee recommended that a new school be started to
accommodate the sixteen teachers and the students who would not
like to go back to Miss Kwan's school. The warning letters
issued to the teachers were also recinded.
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APPENDIX 4
CHRONOLOGY OF THE JUBILEE SCHOOL AFFAJR
Source:
16 Teachers of the Jubilee School, 1978:
The Jubilee School Affair.
Publisher: Teach & Learn Magazine.
PP.122-127
金 禧 事 件 紀 略
73.9. 金 禧 中 學 創 校 。
73.9-76.12. 開 校 以 來 ， 教 師 已 發 覺 校 方 處 理 財 政
不 當 ， 教 師 多 次 就 個 別 事 件 詢 問 校 長
梁 潔 芬 修 女 ， 但 學 校 斂 財 事 件 卻 有 增
無 巳 。
76.12. 部 分 教 師 開 始 詳 細 了 解 金 禧 斂 財 問 題
。
77.2.1. 三 位 教 師 在 教 協 會 長 司 徒 華 安 排 及 陪
同 下 ， 往 見 廉 政 專 員 姬 達 ， 廉 署 接 納
為 正 式 投 訴 。
77.4.5. 教 師 代 表 陳 松 齡 、 范 美 容 面 見 校 長 梁
修 女 ， 要 求 澄 清 斂 財 問 題 ， 並 指 出 寶
血 會 應 負 責 任 。
77.4.6. 陳 、 范 兩 人 數 度 要 求 面 見 當 時 在 校 之
寶 血 會 會 長 胡 秀 英 修 女 ， 被 拒 。 全 體
教 師 會 議 後 聯 名 函 約 會 方 、 校 方 ， 討
論 財 政 問 題 。
77.4.10. 梁 修 女 與 另 一 寶 血 會 修 女 周 燕 霞 強 要
會 計 修 改 帳 目 ， 後 來 以 數 千 元 現 金 償
還 學 校 戶 口 。
77.4.11. 校 方 、 會 方 與 全 體 職 員 舉 行 會 議 。 教
師 陳 明 各 斂 財 事 項 ， 校 方 、 會 方 僅 作
聆 聽 ， 拒 答 任 何 問 題 。
77.4.12. 寶 血 會 向 教 署 報 告 校 方 帳 目 有 問 題 。
（ 此 日 期 教 師 於 4.22 從 教 署 得 知 ） 。
77.4.14. 寶 血 會 會 長 在 與 全 體 教 師 會 議 中 宣 布
梁 修 女 辭 職 、 校 董 會 改 組 ， 並 宣 佈 已
將 四 年 來 之 帳 簿 交 教 署 重 新 審 核 。 教
師 在 會 上 提 出 三 項 要 求 。
77.4.15. 校 方 書 面 通 知 教 師 ， 教 署 官 員 馮 炳 祥
加 入 校 董 會 、 蕭 麗 芳 修 女 任 代 校 長 。
77.4.18. 廉 署 口 頭 通 知 三 教 師 ， 謂 廉 署 已 停 止
調 查 金 禧 斂 財 事 件 ， 建 議 將 案 件 連 投
訴 人 姓 名 轉 教 署 處 理 ， 三 投 訴 教 師 婉
拒 廉 署 建 議 。
77.4.19. 全 體 教 師 會 議 ， 議 決 將 校 方 斂 財 資 料
編 成 備 忘 錄 ， 交 教 署 作 調 查 參 考 用 ，
並 決 定 去 函 校 方 及 會 方 ， 重 申 須 保 證
4.14. 會 議 教 師 所 提 之 三 項 要 求 。
77.4.22. 教 師 代 表 將 校 方 斂 財 資 料 冊 交 教 署 。
77.5.1. 萬 人 日 報 刊 出 讀 者 來 函 ， 稱 赤
色 魔 爪 伸 入 金 禧 。
77.5.2. 全 體 教 師 致 函 校 方 、 會 方 ， 要 求 澄 清
謠 言 。
77.5.5. 校 方 、 會 方 覆 函 ， 對 澄 清 謠 言 之 要 求
予 以 拒 絶 。
77.5.9. 學 生 家 長 接 到 一 教 師 函 件 及 資 料
冊 。
77.5.16. 學 生 會 要 求 校 方 解 釋 斂 財 事 件 ， 被 拒 。
77.5.30. 中 五 學 生 聯 署 要 求 校 方 解 釋 斂 財 事 件
， 被 拒 。
77.6.2. 中 五 學 生 發 信 各 班 聯 署 ， 要 求 校 方 解
釋 斂 財 事 件 。 代 校 長 蕭 修 女 命 各 班 主
任 至 扌 班 沒 收 該 等 信 件 ， 有 八 班 學 生
拒交。
廉 署 書 面 通 知 投 訴 教 師 ， 因 金 禧 校 方
貪 污 無 據 ， 停 止 採 取 行 動 。
77.6.3. 校 方 發 出 教 師 聘 書 及 新 約 章 。
77.6.4. 報 載 教 署 金 禧 財 政 問 題 調 查 報 告
交 律 政 司 。
77.6.6. 全 體 教 師 致 函 校 方 ， 要 求 修 改 新 約 章
中 有 關 解 聘 之 條 文 。
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77.6.7. 教 師 就 約 章 問 題 致 函 校 方 ， 補 充 6.6.
之 函 件
77.6.9. 校 方 覆 函 教 師 ， 拒 絶 修 改 新 約 章 。
學 生 靜 坐 ， 要 求 解 釋 有 關 學 校 斂 財 問
題 及 教 師 新 約 章 問 題
77.6.10. 學 生 繼 續 靜 坐 ， 並 要 求 由 教 師 代 表 解
釋 財 政 問 題 。 三 教 署 官 員 曾 在 代 校 長
陪 同 下 到 場 。
77.6.13. 教 師 在 教 協 會 長 司 徒 華 陪 同 下 往 教 署
詢 問 有 關 新 聘 約 及 斂 財 事 件 調 查 進 行
情 況 。
政 府 新 聞 處 公 佈 ， 律 政 司 署 已 將 案 件
交 警 方 調 查 。
77.6.16. 陶 建 發 信 警 告 教 師 ， 威 脅 要 吊 銷 教 師
執 照 。
77.6.17. 教 師 收 信 後 即 向 教 協 投 訴 ， 尋 求 協 助
。
77.6.20. 代 校 長 蕭 修 女 宣 佈 解 散 學 生 會 。
八 百 多 學 生 聯 名 致 函 教 署 ， 申 明 靜 坐
與 教 師 無 關 。
77.7.5. 教 協 會 長 司 徒 華 就 警 告 信 事 致 函 陶 建
， 要 求 解 釋 。 此 後 ， 司 徒 華 曾 再 度 兩
次 於 9.16. 及 10.25. 致 函 教 署 ， 要 求
解 釋 ； 教 署 之 覆 函 則 稱 無 任 何 資 料
補 充 。
77.7.9. 許 瑜 在 聖 嘉 勒 女 子 中 學 頒 獎 禮 上 指 稱
有 人 對 教 會 進 行 污 衊 運 動 。
77.7.18. 香 港 觀 察 社 在 南 華 早 報 就 警 告 信 事 ，
撰 文 抨 擊 陶 建 ， 要 求 陶 建 撤 消 警 告 信
。 該 社 並 在 77.10.18. 再 公 開 要 求 陶
建 撤 回 警 告 信 ， 亦 遭 拒 絶 。
77.8.1. 關 慧 賢 接 任 校 長 ， 朱 樂 蓮 修 女 接 任 佼
監 。
77.8.29. 關 慧 賢 單 獨 主 持 新 生 家 長 日 ， 在 會 上
污 衊 舊 師 生 ， 暗 示 新 生 勿 與 舊 師 生 接
近 。
77.9.1. 關 慧 賢 召 開 全 年 唯 一 之 全 體 教 師 會 議
， 表 示 清 楚 每 一 教 師 資 料 ； 此 外 ， 只
談 教 師 升 級 機 會 。
77.9.2. 新 學 期 開 學 禮 ， 關 慧 賢 表 示 奉 調 而 來
， 革 新 校 政 。
77.9.9. 關 慧 賢 發 家 長 通 告 ， 表 示 校 務 紛 繁
， 環 境 特 殊 ， 益 使 心 力 疲 瘁 ， 暫 不
舉 辦 課 外 活 動 。
77.9.12. 在 中 一 學 生 的 週 會 上 ， 關 慧 賢 示 意 中
一 學 生 ， 若 遇 高 班 同 學 要 求 做 任 何 事
， 要 即 時 報 告 。
學 生 自 接 近 教 署 人 士 獲 悉 學 校 準 備 辭
退 五 位 教 師 之 消 息 ， 此 後 有 關 會 解 僱
舊 教 師 之 消 息 由 各 方 傳 來 。
77.9.16. 粥 舖 事 件 。 一 高 班 學 生 為 照 顧 在 粥 舖
不 慎 受 燙 傷 之 中 一 學 生 ， 被 關 慧 賢 公
開 指 責 。
77.9. 學 生 會 三 位 主 席 多 次 向 關 慧 賢 詢 問 重
組 學 生 會 事 ， 每 次 均 被 關 慧 賢 以 校 董
會 未 有 決 定 而 拒 絶 。
77.10.7. 教 師 揭 發 家 政 科 帳 單 被 塗 改 事 。 同 日
教 師 要 求 會 見 關 慧 賢 ， 被 拒 。
77.10.9. 關 慧 賢 指 使 某 些 教 師 投 函 報 館 ， 攻 擊
揭 發 家 攻 科 帳 單 被 塗 改 事 之 舊 教 師 。
77.10.10. 教 師 致 函 關 慧 賢 要 求 商 議 解 釋 ， 唯 被
拒。
同 日 ， 教 師 致 函 教 署 、 主 教 要 求 調 查
。
同 日 ， 家 政 科 教 師 要 求 見 面 教 署 調 查
員 ， 為 關 慧 賢 所 拒 。
77.10.12. 羅 慕 潔 宣 佈 學 生 須 携 學 生 證 回 校 以 證
明 身 份 。
77.10.13. 羅 慕 潔 因 中 二 智 學 生 小 息 時 開 班 會 討
論 與 鄭 班 球 賽 ， 軀 逐 該 班 學 生 出 課 室
， 並 命 工 友 鎖 課 室 門 。
77.10.14. 中 四 仁 書 包 被 秘 密 搜 查 ， 關 慧 賢 聲 稱
召 警 鎮 壓 學 生 。
會 計 郭 小 姐 被 無 理 辭 退 。
77.10.15. 羅 慕 潔 及 劉 子 濂 往 見 校 監 朱 樂 蓮 修 女
， 校 監 表 示 正 等 待 危 機 出 現 ， 即 革 除
揭 發 斂 財 之 舊 教 師 ； 並 指 示 支 持 校 方
之 教 師 日 後 上 課 時 只 抄 黑 板 ， 多 給 功
課 ， 以 對 付 學 生 。
當 晚 ， 某 些 教 師 在 關 慧 賢 家 中 ， 關 慧
賢 向 他 們 表 示 揭 發 斂 才 之 三 位 教 師 代
表 為 革 馬 盟 份 子 ， 並 稱 消 息 來 自
港 府 高 官 。
77.10.17. 陳 松 齡 通 知 學 生 一 舊 教 師 辭 職 ， 遭 關
120
慧 賢 口 頭 緊 告 。
由 是 日 起 至 10.22. ， 陳 見 微 函 件
重 覆 見 報 ， 誣 衊 舊 教 師 為 滋 事 分 子 。
77.10.19. 由 是 日 起 至 10.21 ， 一 讀 者 指 稱
金 禧 校 內 出 現 革 馬 盟 份 子 的 函 件
重 覆 見 報 。
77.10.20. 中 一 仁 失 竊 事 件 ， 關 慧 賢 處 理 時
敷 衍 苟 且 ， 有 違 教 育 原 則 。
77.10.24. 因 中 二 鎖 門 事 件 、 中 四 仁 被
秘 密 搜 書 包 事 件 發 生 ， 教 師 致 函 校
董 會 ， 要 求 商 談 校 內 情 況 ， 唯 並 無 回
音。
77.10.26. 教 師 與 教 協 會 長 司 徒 華 談 校 內 問 題 ，
希 望 設 法 與 校 方 溝 通 。
77.11.2. 劉 子 濂 向 被 誣 衊 之 三 教 師 書 面 道 歉 ，
承 認 一 讀 者 之 投 函 乃 其 手 筆 ， 並
詳 述 事 情 經 過 。
77.11.5. 大 專 團 體 出 版 金 禧 事 件 發 展 特 刊
。
77.11.18. 關 慧 賢 批 淮 申 請 已 久 之 課 外 活 動 。
77.11.25. 中 五 仁 被 秘 密 搜 書 包 。
77.12.6. 大 專 團 體 出 版 金 禧 事 件 發 展 特 刊
， 內 刊 劉 子 濂 致 被 誣 為 革 馬 盟 份 子
教 師 之 道 歉 信 。
77.12.21. 學 生 會 致 函 蕭 修 女 、 校 董 會 、 關 慧 賢
， 詢 問 有 關 學 生 會 重 組 事 ， 唯 並 無 答
覆 。
77.12. 是 月 內 ， 學 生 患 病 者 眾 ， 關 慧 賢 每 以
不 負 此 責 為 理 由 ， 拒 派 職 工 、 教
員 將 學 生 送 院 或 護 送 回 家 。 關 慧 賢 又
蓄 意 阻 撓 教 師 照 顧 患 病 者 。
78.1.18. 司 徒 華 致 函 律 政 司 ， 要 求 迅 速 調 查 金
禧 之 案 件 。
78.1.20. 教 師 去 函 天 主 教 區 委 任 之 香 港 正 義 和
平 委 員 會 ， 述 金 禧 事 件 始 末 ， 要 求 叙
談 。 該 會 於 1.26. 覆 函 教 師 ， 表 示 已
將 函 件 資 料 轉 交 主 教 。
78.1.27. 警 方 商 業 犯 罪 調 查 科 一 名 督 察 到 校 見
陳 松 齡 及 范 美 容 ， 並 表 示 可 能 起 訴 梁
修 女 。
78.2.14. 警 方 起 訴 梁 修 女 十 項 訛 騙 公 帑 罪 名 ，
案 涉 八 千 餘 元 。
78.2.15. 中 五 學 生 以 各 班 名 義 致 函 關 慧 賢 、 校
董 會 、 教 署 ， 要 求 開 設 中 六 。
78.2.19. 教 師 致 函 校 董 會 ， 要 求 開 設 中 六 ， 唯
並 無 答 覆 。
78.2.20. 十 五 位 教 師 致 函 校 董 會 要 求 澄 清 77 年
10 月 報 載 之 革 馬 盟 份 子 謠 言 。
十 五 位 教 師 致 函 陶 建 ， 要 求 撤 消 警 告
信 ， 唯 教 署 於 2.27. 覆 函 拒 撤 警 告 信 。
78.2.21. 梁 修 女 被 改 控 偽 造 帳 目 罪 ， 梁 認 罪 。
78.2.23. 梁 修 女 被 判 入 獄 半 年 ， 緩 刑 兩 年 。
78.2.24. 香 港 專 上 學 生 聯 會 召 開 記 者 招 待 會 ，
要 求 全 面 公 佈 調 查 結 果 及 保 障 教 師 職
業 。 教 師 在 會 上 透 露 校 方 斂 財 達 三 十
萬。
香 港 觀 察 社 再 次 公 開 要 求 陶 建 撤 消 警
告 信 。 教 署 隨 即 拒 絶 。
78.2.26. 教 協 、 教 育 行 動 組 、 天 主 教 大 專 聯 會
召 開 記 者 招 待 會 ， 要 求 全 面 公 佈 調 查
結 果 、 撤 消 警 告 信 。
賽 血 會 發 凍 結 帳 目 之 啟 事 。
78.2.27. 教 師 與 文 教 人 員 社 會 改 進 協 會 商 談 有
關 金 禧 問 題 。 其 後 該 會 郭 樂 賢 神 父 面
見 校 監 ， 希 望 安 排 教 師 與 校 監 會 面 ，
唯 未 果 。
78.3.2. 寶 血 會 將 三 十 二 萬 餘 元 撥 回 金 禧 學 校
戶 口 。 （ 此 事 於 4.4. 始 由 教 署 宣 佈 。 ）
78.3.6. 教 師 致 函 校 董 會 ， 詳 述 校 內 不 正 常 情
況 及 關 慧 賢 之 無 理 措 施 ， 唯 並 無 答 覆
。
78.3.14. 香 港 正 義 和 平 委 員 會 致 函 陶 建 ， 要 求
撤 消 警 告 信 。
78.3.18. 中 五 學 生 致 函 教 署 、 校 董 會 ， 要 求 就
開 設 中 六 事 作 答 覆 。
78.3. 關 慧 賢 通 知 學 生 代 表 ， 謂 學 生 會 重 組
問 題 須 交 校 董 會 考 慮 。
78.4. 4 月 初 ， 中 五 學 生 接 觸 教 協 、 教 育 行
動 組 及 學 生 團 體 ， 尋 求 協 助 爭 取 開 設
中 六 。
78.4.3. 校 方 無 理 發 信 警 告 黃 顯 華 、 丘 萍 芳 、
鄭 燕 祥 、 劉 子 濂 、 湯 鵬 舉 。
78.4.4. 教 署 宣 佈 寶 血 會 已 於 三 月 二 日 將 三 十
餘 萬 元 撥 回 金 禧 戶 口 ； 並 宣 佈 己 吊 銷
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梁 修 女 註 冊 校 監 及 註 冊 教 師 資 格 。
78.4.11. 關 慧 賢 張 貼 校 監 信 ， 信 中 指 責 學 生 向
外 界 尋 求 協 助 爭 取 開 設 中 六 。
78.4.13. 中 五 學 生 致 函 關 慧 賢 、 校 董 會 、 教 署
， 要 求 開 設 中 六 及 重 組 學 生 會 ， 副 本
寄 各 報 館 。
78.4.14. 中 二 義 書 包 被 秘 密 搜 查 ， 投 訴 學 生 反
被 指 有 嫌 疑 。
78.4.18. 關 慧 賢 貼 艸 致 全 體 同 學 公 開 信 ， 稱 校
董 會 仍 在 研 究 有 關 開 設 中 六 問 題 。
78.4.19. 中 二 各 班 代 表 向 羅 慕 潔 詢 問 搜 書 包 事
調 查 結 果 ， 羅 推 說 已 交 關 慧 賢 處 理 。
78.4.27. 各 班 學 生 代 表 詢 問 關 慧 賢 中 二 義 事 件
調 查 結 果 ； 關 拒 答 ， 不 顧 學 生 。
78.4.28. 學 生 向 羅 慕 潔 詢 問 中 二 義 事 件 調 查 結
果 ， 不 得 要 領 。
78.5.1. （ 星 期 一 ） 關 慧 賢 指 學 生 詢 問 中 二 義 事 件 時
圍 困 校 長 、 副 校 長 ， 書 面 警
告 七 名 學 生 ， 其 中 四 名 被 勒 令 停
課 兩 週 。
九 名 教 師 就 學 生 被 停 課 事 往 聖 嘉
勒 中 學 見 校 監 ， 校 監 拒 見 。
晚 上 ， 家 長 向 教 協 司 徒 華 求 助 。
由 是 日 起 ， 校 方 實 行 夏 令 時 間 。
78.5.2. （ 星 期 二 ） 早 上 ， 關 慧 賢 要 學 生 出 示 學 生 證
始 淮 入 校 。
教 師 上 課 前 就 學 生 被 停 課 事 要 求
見 關 慧 賢 ， 被 拒 。
被 停 課 學 生 之 家 長 要 求 聯 同 面 見
關 慧 賢 ， 被 拒 。
家 長 、 學 生 在 司 徒 華 陪 同 下 ， 往
教 署 九 龍 分 署 投 訴 ， 教 署 官 員 稱
須 直 接 由 總 部 處 理 。
家 長 、 學 生 在 司 徒 華 及 教 師 陪 同
下 往 兩 局 非 官 守 議 員 辦 事 處 投 訴
。
78.5.3. （ 星 期 三 ） 上 午 ， 司 徒 華 往 見 關 慧 賢 。
下 午 ， 中 二 學 生 回 校 測 驗 ， 遭 職
工 毆 傷 。
同 日 ， 關 慧 賢 函 學 生 家 長 ， 重 申
維 持 停 學 、 警 告 之 決 定 。
教 署 發 信 警 告 司 徒 華 。
78.5.5. （ 星 期 五 ） 中 午 ， 教 師 為 學 生 遭 職 工 毆 傷 事
要 求 見 關 慧 賢 ， 被 拒 。 關 慧 賢 召
警 ， 稱 遭 恐 嚇 。
家 長 、 教 師 帶 受 傷 學 生 報 案 及 驗
傷 。
78.5.7. （ 星 期 日 ） 教 協 與 學 生 家 長 就 學 生 受 校 方 迫
害 舉 行 記 者 招 待 會 。
78.5.8. （ 星 期 一 ） 關 慧 賢 及 朱 樂 蓮 舉 行 記 者 招 待 會
， 關 慧 賢 於 會 上 歪 曲 學 生 形 象 。
教 署 聲 明 絶 對 支 持 關 慧 賢 。
78.5.9. （ 星 期 二 ） 師 生 、 家 長 向 港 督 、 主 教 請 願 。
約 見 主 教 不 果 ， 教 師 及 部 份 家 長
在 主 教 府 門 外 靜 坐 露 宿 。
78.5.10. （ 星 期 三 ） 師 生 、 家 長 繼 續 靜 坐 。 校 內 部 份
學 生 罷 課 。 教 師 及 部 份 家 長 繼 續
露 宿 。
林 達 鎏 公 開 表 示 教 署 可 能 封 校 ，
革 除 學 生 ， 解 聘 教 師 。
78.5.11. （ 星 期 四 ） 七 大 專 團 體 巡 迴 請 願 ， 支 持 靜 坐
師 生 、 家 長 。
教 協 及 文 教 人 員 社 會 改 進 協 會 發
表 聲 明 ， 呼 籲 先 復 課 ， 後 調 查
。
主 教 委 出 四 代 表 會 見 教 師 、 學 生
、 家 長 代 表 ， 但 只 作 聆 聽 。
78.5.12. （ 星 期 五 ） 師 生 、 家 長 響 應 教 育 團 體 之 呼 籲
， 全 體 師 生 回 校 準 備 復 課 。 九 位
神 職 界 人 士 ， 包 括 兩 位 主 教 代 表
亦 同 時 到 校 請 關 慧 賢 淮 許 四 名 停
課 學 生 進 校 ， 但 關 慧 賢 拒 絶 該 四
名 學 生 復 課 。 師 生 在 校 內 繼 續 靜
坐 ， 然 後 決 定 於 下 星 期 一 恢 復 上
課。
關 慧 賢 舉 行 記 者 招 待 會 。
下 午 ， 學 聯 在 港 大 舉 行 金 禧 事
件 公 開 論 壇 。
78.5.13. （ 星 期 六 ） 選 修 美 術 之 中 四 學 生 照 常 上 課 。
78.5.14. （ 星 期 日 ） 下 午 五 時 ， 教 署 宣 佈 封 閉 金 禧 中
學 ， 只 安 排 中 一 學 生 在 他 校 上 課
。 校 監 宣 佈 九 月 在 原 址 改 辦 德
蘭 中 學 ， 解 僱 十 六 位 靜 坐 教 師
。
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晚 ， 學 聯 及 八 專 上 院 校 學 生 會 發
表 聲 明 ， 要 求 撤 消 封 校 令 。
78.5.15. （ 星 期 一 ） 師 生 、 家 長 向 港 督 請 願 ； 隨 後 ，
在 港 大 舉 行 記 者 招 待 會 及 公 開 論
壇 ； 之 後 ， 師 生 、 家 長 向 主 教 請
願 ； 當 晚 ， 教 師 、 家 長 於 主 教 府
前 靜 坐 及 露 宿 。
78.5.16. （ 星 期 二 ） 行 政 局 會 議 ， 支 持 教 署 封 校 ， 委
出 三 人 委 員 會 ， 以 防 止 類 似 事
情 發 生 。
教 協 向 港 督 、 教 署 、 主 教 等 請 願
。
大 專 同 學 籌 劃 金 禧 學 生 補 習 事 。
教 師 、 家 長 繼 續 靜 坐 露 宿 。
廿 餘 名 神 父 、 修 女 發 表 聲 明 反 對
封 校 ， 並 對 主 教 處 事 態 度 表 示 異
議。
78.5.17. （ 星 期 三 ） 家 長 向 港 督 及 主 教 請 願 。
下 午 ， 教 教 發 匸 聲 明 支 持 封 校 。
靜 坐 教 師 發 表 聲 明 抗 議 主 教 支 持
封 校 。
78.5.18. （ 星 期 四 ） 家 長 、 教 師 向 主 教 遞 交 抗 議 書 。
77.5.19. （ 星 期 五 ） 師 生 家 長 及 大 專 同 學 往 教 署 遞 交
抗 議 書 ； 隨 後 宣 佈 學 生 將 在 中 大
、 港 大 生 學 會 安 排 之 地 點 補 習 。
78.5.20. （ 星 期 六 ） 教 署 宣 佈 安 排 中 二 至 中 四 學 生 在
其 他 學 校 上 課 。
78.5.21. （ 星 期 日 ） 學 生 家 長 聲 明 反 對 教 署 安 排 學 生
在 他 校 上 課 。
78.5.22. （ 星 期 一 ） 師 生 、 家 長 發 表 聲 明 ， 宣 佈 成 立
金 禧 師 生 及 家 長 爭 取 復 校 委 員
會 ， 教 師 派 代 表 繼 續 靜 坐 露 宿
。
各 界 爭 取 金 禧 復 校 委 員 會 成
立 。
補 習 班 在 中 大 舉 行 開 學 禮 。
中 一 學 生 在 教 署 安 排 下 在 樂 富 官
立 小 學 上 課 。
78.5.23. （ 星 期 二 ） 學 生 分 別 在 中 大 、 港 大 學 生 會 安
排 之 地 點 補 課 。
78.5.24. （ 星 期 三 ） 港 大 學 生 會 舉 辦 金 禧 事 件 展 覽
。
民 政 署 人 員 開 始 訪 家 長 ， 游 說 學
生 接 受 教 署 安 排 在 他 校 上 課 ， 可
在 他 校 升 級 ， 並 稱 可 以 獲 得 金 錢
資 助 。
校 監 裡 面 通 知 靜 坐 教 師 已 被 校 董
會 解 僱 。
78.5.26. （ 星 期 五 ） 各 界 爭 取 復 校 委 員 會 就 維 園 民 眾
大 會 舉 行 記 者 招 待 會 。
民 政 署 宣 佈 已 將 金 禧 事 件 民 意
調 查 結 果 交 港 督 。
78.5.27. （ 星 期 六 ） 教 育 行 動 組 將 金 禧 事 件 資 料 寄 英
國 國 會 議 員 。
港 大 社 會 科 學 學 會 發 表 金 禧 事
件 民 意 調 查 結 果 ， 顯 示 百 分 之
八 十 以 上 市 民 反 對 封 校 。
教 署 宣 佈 在 何 文 田 官 中 設 特 別 班
收 容 金 禧 學 生 。
大 專 學 生 張 貼 維 園 集 會 海 報 ， 被
捕。
78.5.28. （ 星 期 日 ） 各 界 在 維 園 舉 行 金 禧 事 件 民 眾
大 會 ， 萬 餘 人 參 加 ， 各 代 表 提
議 先 復 校 ， 後 調 查 ， 大 會 一
致 通 過 宣 言 ， 並 發 起 簽 名 運 動 及
一 人 一 元 籌 款 運 動 。
廉 署 公 開 證 實 教 師 首 先 揭 發 斂 財
事 件 。
78.5.29. （ 星 期 一 ） 香 港 觀 察 社 發 表 金 禧 事 件 詳 情 ，
認 為 許 瑜 應 向 教 師 道 歉 。
陶 建 返 港 ， 發 表 聲 明 ， 稱 封 校 乃
實 際 需 要 的 措 施 。
78.6.2. （ 星 期 五 ） 靜 坐 教 師 第 一 次 會 見 三 人 調 查 委
員 會 。
正 義 和 平 委 員 會 發 表 關 注 金 禧
事 件 工 作 報 告 。
78.6.3. （ 星 期 六 ） 教 署 否 認 安 排 在 他 校 上 課 之 學 生
可 獲 津 貼 。
78.6.6. （ 星 期 二 ） 靜 坐 教 師 第 二 次 見 三 人 調 查 委 員
會 。
78.6.7. （ 星 期 三 ） 家 長 舉 行 記 者 招 待 會 ， 反 對 教 署
、 民 政 署 以 威 迫 利 誘 手 段 分 化 學
生 。
78.6.8. （ 星 期 四 ） 簽 名 運 動 及 一 人 一 元 運 動 展 開 。
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78.6.10. （ 星 期 六 ） 師 生 、 家 長 在 各 界 陪 同 下 ， 再 向
港 督 、 主 教 請 願 。 主 教 視 若 無 睹
。
78.6.13. （ 星 期 二 ） 靜 坐 教 師 最 後 一 次 見 三 人 調 查 委
員 會。
教 署 透 露 過 去 一 年 內 有 一 ○ 一 間
學 校 被 投 訴 財 政 處 理 不 當 。
78.6.15. （ 星 期 四 ） 教 協 發 表 聲 明 ， 促 請 有 關 當 局 復
校 。
78.6.16. （ 星 期 五 ） 師 生 、 家 長 代 表 與 主 教 代 表 會 晤
。 主 教 代 表 只 作 聆 聽 。
港 大 學 生 因 張 貼 宣 傳 簽 名 運 動 、
一 人 一 元 運 動 海 報 被 拘 。
78.6.21. （ 星 期 三 ） 主 教 函 覆 師 生 、 家 長 代 表 ， 拒 絶
接 納 師 生 、 家 長 意 見 。
78.6.22. （ 星 期 四 ） 教 協 聯 同 港 大 學 生 會 就 港 大 學 生
遭 警 方 無 理 對 待 事 舉 行 記 者 招 待
會 。
78.6.23. （ 星 期 五 ） 各 界 爭 取 復 校 委 員 會 舉 行 記 者 招
待 會 ， 宣 佈 6.25 大 請 願 改 於 7.
9. 舉 行 。
78.6.24. （ 星 期 六 ） 核 數 署 長 獲 授 權 查 核 資 助 學 校 帳
目。
78.6.25. （ 星 期 日 ） 師 生 、 家 長 舉 行 記 者 招 待 會 ， 宣
佈 派 代 表 赴 英 ， 尋 求 合 理 解 決 金
禧 事 件 的 途 徑 。
78.6.26. （ 星 期 一 ） 師 生 、 家 長 代 表 韋 榮 光 、 范 美 容
赴 英 。 尋 求 海 外 支 持 ， 爭 取 復 校
。
78.7.7. （ 星 期 五 ） 一 群 金 禧 復 校 的 支 持 者 開 始 進 行
四 十 八 小 時 絶 食 之 行 動 ， 希 望 促
成 金 禧 復 校 ； 二 位 靜 坐 教 師 代 表
亦 參 與 行 動 。
78.7.9. （ 星 期 日 ） 各 界 爭 取 復 校 委 員 會 舉 行 數 千 人
之 民 眾 大 請 願 ， 向 港 督 及 主 教 遞
交 請 願 書 。
78.7.14. （ 星 期 五 ） 三 人 調 查 委 員 會 發 表 中 期 報 告 書
， 提 出 另 設 一 所 新 校 ， 供 金 禧 學
生 選 擇 等 建 議 ， 教 署 表 示 接 納 。
（ 至 七 八 年 七 月 十 四 日 ）
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APPENDIX 3
THEMATIC STATEMENTS AND FREQUENCIES
The Frequency Distribution of Thematic Statements is in
AbbreviationsPercentage Calculated on the Basis of the Number of the
R= Rightist NewspapersNewspaper Items (n) Sampled and is Allocated By the
C= Centrist NewspapersNewspapers' Party Identification with the Form of Coverage
L= Leftist NewspapersBeing Controlled.
Forms of Coverage
News Editorials Letters HeadlinesThematic Statements
R C LR C L R C L R C L
The Government's measures were necessary for the maint ance of 3.8 4.1 4.2 33.3 2.4 4.215.8 12.5 0 1.9 2.0 0school peace/ social order/ the dignity of education.
The Government's sendinp, out warning letters and closing the 18.4 12.5 0 22.2 2.4 8.3 0 0.7 02.9 2.7 3.2school were timely measures
The Government's measures were fair/well thought. 55.6 4.9 .8.321.1 0 0 4.8 0 05.7 2.0. 5.3
The protesters were disruption social peace/social order. 33.3 4.9 20.812.4 4.7 1.1 3.8 0.7 039.5 6.3 0
The protests could be a spark that might kindle a great prairie/ 1.9. 0.7 0 11.1 4.9 010.5 0.0 0 0 0 0They should be stopped before they spread.
The Government's determined policies could intimidate the potential 1.0 0 1.1 13.2 0 0 11.1 0 8.3 0 0 0
violators of the authority structure of school.
The Government should prevent this from happening again. 8.6 2.0 3. 0 18.4 12.5 0 0 2.4 4.2 5.8 1.4 1.1
The school had been infiltrated by leftists/political activists. 0 0 0 34.2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The event .had a polititcal backgr. ound. 72.9 0 0 36.2 0 0 22.2 2.4 0 0 0 0
The event had something to do with the local :'Revolutionary 91.0 0 0 15.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Marxist Union.
The protesters' behaviour resembles that of rebels in the 1967 0 0 0 13.2 0 0 33.3 0 0 0 0 0
riots/or Cultureal Revolution.
The protesting teachers were activated by selfish ulterior motives.
5.7 2.0 1.1 42.1 6.3 0 122.2 12.2For examples: The teachers wanted to take over the school. 3.8 0 0
The protesting students were blind followers/They were being used. 3.4 6.1 5.3 42.1 12.5 0 44.4 14.6 0 4.8 0.7 0
The protesting teachers and students were defying hierachical,
order/The low should respect the high. 7.6 3.4 4.2 28.9 12.5 0 11.1 7.3 0 2.9 0 0
Teaching and learning were the jobs of the teachers and students
who should end their radical activites and return*to the classroom. 7.9 25.0 0 22.2 9.8 04.8 2.7 3.2 1.0 1.4 0
The protesters should have learned lesson from the codes of
behaviour in Chinese traditional culture. 2.9 0 0 2.6 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
The Government's measures had ridden the students of their right
to study - which should be restored. 6.7 4.7 8.4 0 0 60.0 1.0 0 1.1
The Government's policies were suppressive/bureaucratic/colonial.
0 0 40.02.9 2.7 7.4 0 0.7 2.211.1 4.9 4.2
The Government's policies were unreasonable/ They could not solve
0 31.3 80.011.4 34.5 36.8 4.8 16.3 6.511.1 41.5 33.3the problem.
No. of items (n)




SOME CORROBORATING EVIDENCES FROM A QUESTIONNAIRE SURVEY
One purpose of the survey by questionnaire conducted
,by this author is to corroborate some theoretical points in
the discussion of the relation between party identification
and journalistic paradigms on protest. In this appendix, I shall
'describe the sampling method and some relevant findings.
Appendix 5 gives a sample questionnaire and frequencies.
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1. Sampling
The survey was administered to 25 reporters, mainly
former graduates of the Chinese University of Hong Kong
in the pretest. They were asked to make comments on the
use of language and the content of the items in the question-
naire. Based on the frequency distribution of the answers
and the respondents'. comments, a new questionnaire was designed.
According to the figures.provided by informants in the 23
newspapers included in our sample, there are only 340 city
reporters in Hong Kong. Only the city reporters were sampled
because they were responsible for covering social events which
constitute the object of my study. Many mosquito newspapers
on horseracing and entertainment were excluded. So, my intended
sample was a population sample of newspapers.
The questionnaires, enclosed in envelopes, were delivered
to reporters through informants (mostly former graduates of
the Chinese University of Hong Kong) working in respective
institutions. In places where no informants were available,
we had the questionnaires distributed by the assignment,
editors. The reporters were asked to seal the answered
questionnaire.with an envelope and return through.the same
delivery agent. They were allowed to return by mail. To
increase the 'response rate, the agents were reminded and
encouraged to "chase-after" the potential respondents to
answer the questionnaire from time to time.
A total of 362 questionnaires had been sent out and 218
returned. Of the returned questionnaires 204 were usuabie.
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with a response rate of 56.4%. There is no way to know
whether the non-respondents are different from the res-
pondents. However, the findings match with the impressions
I got during interviews with the editors and reporters.
Here is a detailed account of my sample:
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No. sent Returned Return
Newspaper Party I.D. Out Usable
1. Centre Daily News C:3.0 8 88.99
L: 6.02. Ching Pao Daily 13 12 92.3
3. HK Commercial Daily L:5.0 25 40.0
R:2.04. HK Daily News 23 39.19
C:4.05. HK Economic Journal 68 75.0
6. HK Standard C:4.0 18 10 55.6
7. HK Times R 06 L0 9 5 55.6
8. Kung Sheung Daily News
R:1.0 22 13 59.0
9. Kung Sheung Evening News
10. Ming Pao Daily News
C:4.0 17 17 100.0
11. Ming Pao Evening News
12. New Evening News L:5.0 10 6 60.0
13. Oriental Daily News R:2.0 2655 47.3
14. Sing Pao Daily News C:3.0 13 11 84.6
15. Sing Tao Jih Pao
R:2.0 14 34.141
16. Sing Tao Man Pao
17. South China Morning Post C:4.0 15 6 40.0
18. Ta Kung Pao L:6.0 12 11 91.7
19. Tin Tin Yat Pao C:4.0 13 4 30.8
20. Wah Kiu Yat Po
C:3.0 1033 30.3
21. Wah Kiu Man Po
22. Wen Wei Pao L:6.0 22 16 72.7
23: The Star (both Chinese &
C:3.0 15 12 80.0
English version)
24. Express R:2.0 6 66.79
56.4%Total 362 204
Only the Chinese reporters were included in the sample because the
non-Chinese reporters are likely to have different party systems to
identify with.
The party identification of the press is evaluated by the reporters
working in each of the papers. Scale and abbreviations are:
R for rightist (1-2);C for centrist (3-4); L for leftist (5-6)
The evening and. morning paper under the same title are treated as a
single press institution.
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2. The Sample: With Respect to the Jubilee Affair
Some questions in the questionnaire are about the:
Jubilee School Affair. There exists the possibility that
those reporters who had covered the Jubilee Affiar may show
sys.temati.c different responses to the questions from the
reporters who had not. If the two groups of reporters show
significantly different patterns of responses, I shall have
to treat the groups separately in analysis. Or else, I can
treat the sample as a whole.
Sixty eight percent of the survey respondents did not
cover the Jubilee School Affair three years ago. Only 32.3%
did. This can largely be explained by three.f acts: first,
division of labour only lets a portion of the reporters to
cover the event second, some reporters have left the pro-
fession for better pay and prospect in public relations,
advertising. and other trades third, many new recruits may
have entered the profession of journalism. As a check, I
correlate each item in the questionnaire by the reporters'
experience/non-experience with the Jubilee Affair. All
but the reporters' age and working years have any significant
correlations. All the lamdas equal O. Thus the sample
can be treated as a whole.
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3. Evaluation of role of the press's political ideology
Table A: The most significant factor affecting the
newspapers' position on social protest
Press's Party ID as Evaluated by Reporters
The Most Significant
Factor Rightist Centrist Leftist
% (Rank) % (Rank) % (Rank)
Press's Political 37.8 (1) 31.0 (2) 41.1 (1)
ideology
Public Opinion 34.1 (2) 39.7 (1) 26.8 (2)
Editorial Writer's 18.3 (3) 17.2 (3) 14.3 (3)
Personal Likes
Government's Directives 8.5 (4) 10.3 (4) 12.5 (4)
Reader's Opinion 1.2 (5) 1.7 (5) 5.4 (5)
100.0 100% 100%
N = 196
Giver, five possible determinants of the press's
positioning on controversial social protest, reporters
are asked to rank them in order of importance (Table A).
The two most important factors so identified are the
press' party identification and public opinion. The
percentage distribution under these two headings deserves
a closer look. Only 31% of the centrist press's reporters
rate the press's party identification as the most important
while thecorresponding percentages for the rightist and
leftist are 37.8% and 41.1% respectively. The ordering of
the percentages is reversed under the public opinion heading
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Here the centrist has the highest percentage. This agrees
with our assumption that the centrists are more concerned
about expansion of readership and are less ideological.
4. Reporter's Political Ideology and Stand on the Jubilee Affair








(n) (47) (91) (61)
p<.001 N = 199
The rithtist party identification of the reporters
correlatbs negatively with their support of the protesters
in Jubilee School (Table B) Affair. Of all the leftist
reporters 23% took a neutral stand towards the portesters
the corresponding percentages for the rightists. and
centrists are 36.2 and 47.3 respectively. It indicates
that the leftists are most prone to taking stands, followed
by the rightists. The centrists are mostly "neutralists".
Gamma = -0.53 X
2
= 35.9 df = 4
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5. Self-selection By Political Ideology





Identification as Rightist Centrist Leftist
evaluated by reporters
Rightist 70.2 44.0 16.1
Centrist 25.5 24.238.5
Leftist 4.3 17.6 59.7
100% 100%100%
(n) (47) (91) (62)
Gamma= .65 X2= 57.9 df= 4
p .001 N= 200
The party-linked'press appear to recruit reporters
with their won political inclination (Table C). In other
words, the political orientation of the reporters is an
important determinant in the selection of press institution.
This self-selection process appears to be the most strictly
followed by the leftists. The centrist press shows a pretty
balanced sheet with 56.5% of their reporters possessing
political identification similar to theirs, while the rest
is split almost equally between the leftist and rightist.
The rightist press.seem to be losing grip of their reporters'
political orientation. 39.8% of their reporters have rightist
inclination,48.2% centrist and 12% leftist.
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This self-selection process by political ideology has
an important implication for the press's coverage of social
protests. In the first place, the reporters' individual
party identification does have an effect on their orientation
towards protest such as the Jubilee Affair. Second, the
press's party identification will also have an effect on
the journalists' when covering social protests. When asked
to estimate the influence of the press's party identification
on the respondents' coverage of social protests such as the
Jubilee Affair, the answers are distributed as follows:
Table D: Estimated Influence of Press's Party Identification
on the Reporters' Coverage of Social Protests
Press
Influence of Press's
Party Identification Rightist Centrist Leftist
Influential 62.375.0 80.7
Almost no influence 25.0 19.337.7
(n) (84) (61) (57)
N= 202
Of all the reporters, as many as 70% agree that the
press's party identification is influential in affecting
their coverage of'social protests (Table D). The estimated
influence of the press's party identification on reporting
controversial protests is'highest with the leftist press




THE CORROBORATING QUESTIONNAIRE AND FREQUENCIES
1. Which social problem do you think to be the most critical today?
2. What is the most critical problem facing the Hongkong media today?
3. It has been'said that Hongkong's media generally
reflect the public opinion. Do you agree?
strongly agree 2
agree 63
depending on the situation 117
disagree 19
strongly disagree





















7. How significant is each of the following qualities to a reporter?
Please evaluate each accordingly:
very important important unimportant very
unimportant
134 66 2-objectivity 0
inapplicable): 2
-expertise 126 1756 2
( inapplicable) 3
-writing skills 64 127 29
(inappl icpLble) 2
-sense of social just ice 1391 195
(inapplicable) I
-political ideals 22 83 80 13
( inapplicable) 6















10. Hongkong's pressure group such as the Professional Teachers' Union,
Hongkong Observers, and the Christian Industrial Committee have ttheir
own objectives. and, orientations. In your opinion, which of the
following best characterises their function?
ac-ctng as a watchdog of the Government, suggesting reforms 78
struggling for justifiable group interest 110





11. How valuable do you think is the existence of such pressure groups?
very valuable 43
valuable 150
not so valuable 8
not valuable at all 2
(inapplicable 1
12, When the opinions of the pressure groups differ'from those of the






13. The following may be factdrs affecting your press in commenting
on controversial social events such as the Jubilee Sshool Affair,
the boat-people Affair, ICAC-Police Dispute. Please evaluate each
accordingly:
very very
important important unimportant unimp.
a, the press's political identification 56 93 40 3
(inapplicable): 12
b. the Government's directives/suggestions 19 75 81 13
(inapplicable): 16
C. the direction of public opinion 46 11.9 27 1
(inapplicable): 11.
do the direction of the readers opinion 9 100 75 6
(inapplicable): 14
e. the editorial writer's personal inclination
35 67 65 22
inapplicable: 15
Which of the above is -the' most important? a 72 b 20 c 66 d 5. e 33
(inapplicable): 8




almost no influence 32
no influence 23
2(inapplicable)
15. Between the Taipei Goverment and the Peking Government, your press
identified strongly with.the Taipei Government 22
identifies with the Taipei Government 62
identifies with both 50
identifies with neither 13
identifies with the Peking Government, 24
identifies strongly with the Peking Government 33
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16. When you are reporting such controversial social events, how often
does your editor./assignment editor give guidelines'to orientate your angle?










17. In case your editor/assignment editor's directives or your press stands
differ from your views, what would you do?
obey directives policy 23
voice your views, submit when unaccepted. 38
voice your views, write in subtle expressions when unacc-
epted.66
keep silent but write in subtle expressions
53
try hard to win over your editor, but write in implicit
expressions when unaccepted
12




18. In the treatihent of controversial social events, your views may differ
from your editors..'Please evaluate the importance of each of the possible
factors in causing the difference:
very impottiint un- very un-
import ant important import arA
a. difference, in. position and responsibility
36 85 61 10
(inapplicable): 12
b. difference in political ideals
28 87 57 17
(inapplicable) 15.
c. difference in mode of contact, the reporter direct,
editor indirect.
91 85 18 1
(inapplicable): 9
Which of the above is the most important? a 41 b 40 c 116
(inapplicable): 7
139






20. Do you find this exchange helpful?
very helpful 27
helpful 137
not very helpful 32
not helpful 6
(inapplicable 2







22. What is your stand towards the protesters in the Jubilee School Affair?
very supportive 18
.supportive 77




.23. Have you reported on the Jubilee School Affair?
yes 65
no 137
( inappl icaple) 2
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24. In between the Taipei and Peking Government ,you
identifies strongly with the Taipei Government 12





identifies with the Peking Government
55
identifies strongly with the Peking Government 7
inapplicable)
4
25. You have been a reporter for:
under 1 year 45
1 to 3 years 77
4 to 6 years 51
7 to 10 years 12
more than 10 years 18
inapplicable)
1
26. Your duties include( You may tick more than one items)
local social news reporting 204
local economic news reporting 20




























1. The Baptist College 30
2. Shui Yan College 8
3. The Chinese University of Hong Kong 20
4. The Hong Kong University
7
5. Universities in Taiwan 19



























THE ORIGINAL CORRORORATING QUESTIONATIRE
1. 你 覺 得 香 港 目 前 面 臨 最 重 要 的 社 會 問 題 是 什 麼 ？ 4
2. 你 覺 得 香 港 新 聞 界 目 前 最 重 要 的 問 題 是 什 麼 ？ 　 　 　 5
3. 有 人 說 香 港 新 聞 界 一 般 上 都 能 充 份 反 映 民 意 ， 你 同 意 嗎 ？ 6
十 分 同 意
同 意
看 情 況 而 定
不 同 意
十 分 不 同 意











不 大 可 以
很 困 難
6. 你 滿 意 目 前 的 薪 金 報 酬 嗎 ？ 9
十 分 滿 意
滿 意
還 過 得 去
不 滿 意
十 分 不 滿 意
7. 下 質 素 對 記 得 的 重 要 性 如 何 ？ 請 逐 項 評 價 它 的 重 要 性 ：
1 2 3 4
十 分 重 要 重 要 不 重 要 十 分 不 重 要
客 觀 精 神 10
專 門 知 識 11
文 字 技 巧 12
社 會 正 義 感 13
政 治 理 想 14
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很 不 滿 意





很 不 滿 意
10. 香 港 有 一 些 壓 力 團 體 （ 例 如 ： 教 育 專 業 人 員 協 會 ， 香 港 觀 察 社 ， 基 督
教 工 業 委 員 會 ） ， 它 們 有 特 定 的 目 標 和 意 向 ， 在 你 看 來 ， 它 們 的 最 主
要 作 用 是 甚 麼 ？ 17
監 察 政 府 ， 建 議 改 革
為 個 別 團 體 爭 取 合 理 利 益
為 一 小 撮 人 謀 私 利
滋 事 及 破 壞 社 會 安 寧
11. 像 上 面 這 些 壓 力 團 體 ， 你 覺 得 ： 18
極 有 存 在 價 值
有 存 在 價 值
甚 少 存 在 價 值
沒 有 存 在 價 值
12. 當 政 府 與 一 些 壓 力 團 體 意 見 不 同 時 ， 通 常 你 覺 得 那 一 方 比 較 可 靠 ？
19
政 府 比 較 可 靠
差 不 多
壓 力 團 體 比 較 可 靠
13. 當 一 些 具 有 爭 論 性 的 社 會 事 件 （ 例 如 ： 金 禧 、 艇 戶 事 件 、 廉 警 衝 突 ） 發 生
時 ， 影 響 你 所 屬 報 館 的 立 論 的 因 素 可 能 包 括 下 列 各 項 ， 請 評 價 各 項 的 重 要
性 ：
十 分 重 要 重 要 不 重 要 十 分 不 重 要
a. 報 館 的 政 治 認 同
20b. 政 府 的 指 示 ／ 暗 示
21c. 民 意 的 趨 勢
22d. 讀 者 意 見 的 傾 向
23e. 主 筆 的 個 人 喜 惡
24
上 述 各 項 中 ， 那 一 項 最 重 要 ？ a b c d e
25
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14. 你 所 屬 報 館 的 政 治 認 同 ， 對 你 報 導 這 些 社 會 事 件 時 的 看 法 ， 有 沒 有 影 響 ？ 26
有 大 影 響
有 一 點 影 響
差 不 多 沒 有 影 響
沒 有 影 響
15. 在 台 北 和 北 京 政 府 之 間 ， 你 所 屬 報 館 ： 27
非 常 認 同 台 北 政 府
比 較 認 同 台 北 政 府
兩 者 都 認 同
兩 者 都 不 認 同
比 較 認 同 北 京 政 府
非 常 認 同 北 京 政 府






17. 若 編 輯 ／ 採 主 的 指 示 或 報 館 的 立 場 與 你 的 觀 點 相 異 時 ， 你 多 數 會 ： 29
服 從 指 示 ／ 政 策
表 明 意 見 ， 但 上 司 若 不 接 受 ， 則 遵 從 指 示 。
表 明 意 見 ， 但 上 司 若 不 接 受 ， 則 用 婉 筆 表 達 自 己 的 觀 點
不 作 自 辯 ， 但 用 婉 筆 表 達 自 己 的 觀 點
努 力 說 服 上 司 ， 但 上 司 若 不 接 受 ， 則 用 婉 筆 表 達 自 己 的 觀 點
堅 持 自 己 的 觀 點 ， 不 妥 協
18. 在 處 理 爭 論 性 社 會 事 件 時 ， 記 者 與 上 司 的 觀 點 有 時 會 出 現 一 些 分 歧 。 請 評 價 下
列 各 項 可 能 造 成 觀 點 分 歧 的 因 素 ：
1 2 3 4
十 分 重 要 重 要 不 重 要 十 分 不 重 要
a. 因 為 彼 此 的 職 責 有 別 30
b. 因 為 彼 此 的 政 治 思 想 有 別 31
c. 因 為 記 者 直 接 採 訪 事 件 ，
上 司 則 間 接 了 解 事 件 32
上 述 各 項 中 ， 那 一 項 最 重 要 ？ a b c 33
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從 來 沒 有
20. 你 覺 得 這 些 記 者 的 意 見 對 你 有 沒 有 幫 助 ？ 35
很 有 幫 助
有 些 幫 助
幫 助 不 大
沒 有 幫 助
21. 你 認 為 一 般 記 者 在 報 導 這 些 事 件 時 ， 會 否 受 本 身 的 政 治 理 想 所 影 響 ？ 36
會 有 大 影 響
會 有 一 些 影 響
會 有 微 不 足 道 的 影 響
不 會 有 任 何 影 響
22. 你 對 於 金 禧 師 生 的 行 動 ： 37




十 分 反 對
23. 你 曾 否 採 訪 金 禧 事 件 ？ 38
有
無
24. 在 台 北 與 北 京 政 府 之 間 ， 你 ： 39
非 常 認 同 台 北 政 府
比 較 認 同 台 北 政 府
兩 者 都 認 同
兩 者 都 不 認 同
比 較 認 同 北 京 政 府
非 常 認 同 北 京 政 府
25. 你 任 職 記 者 已 有 ：
40
一 年 以 下
一 至 三 年
四 至 六 年
七 至 十 年
十 年 以 上
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26. 你 的 職 責 範 圍 包 括 （ 可 選 √ 多 過 一 項 ） ： 41
本 港 社 會 新 聞 採 訪
本 港 經 濟 新 聞 採 訪
本 港 政 治 新 聞 採 訪
中 國 新 聞 採 訪
電 訊 翻 譯
編 輯
其 它
27. 你 的 年 齡 ： 42





50 歲 以 上
28. 學 歷 ： 43
小 學 程 度
中 學 程 度
大 專 程 度 學 校 名 稱 44
主 修 系 別
45
29. 你 在 一 個 怎 樣 的 家 庭 中 長 大 ？ 46




非 常 富 裕
30. 性 別 ： 47
男
女
請 把 問 卷 放 進 回 郵 信 封 ， 封 口 後 交 回 調 查 員 ／
聯 絡 人 － 若 然 不 便 ， 請 立 即 寄 回 。 謝 謝 ！
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